# An Extirpation Event

**Abstract**. In this paper it is argued that the seeds for [another] extirpation event to occur in coming centuries are being planted. A historical accounting of the rise of Adolf Hitler is used as an example to explore how concepts of shamanism, group psychology (particularly hypnosis), cooperative banking, [university based] education, and urbanization produce unstable results. Culture and kinship are considered as human needs which have not been adequately accounted for in the development of cities. Hitler's ideas on racism are refuted while some of the legitimately beneficial political and philosophical ideas he championed are defended. In general, it is argued that anti-Semitism (hatred for Jews) was a manifestation of the more fundamental issue of two distinct cultures (not races) existing in a confined geographical area being incompatible with one another, to which nomadism vs. domestication and familial vs. kinship forms of organization are explored under the general heading of traditionalism vs. progressivism.

## Contents

**NIMBYism and Anti-Semitism**

The bottles and empty plastic cups were piled in a nearly unbroken line down the gutters of every street I hit.  Why they bothered to call it 'Pride Fest' was beyond me. What I observed was tens of thousands of mostly straight half-nude teenagers walking around with beer cups in their hands as they pretended not to notice one another, not that they'd hear one another over the mega-bass were they to try to talk.

Come nightfall I had the privilege of cleaning up after them. I had been backpacking along the coast for only a couple weeks when I came to 'The City' and – thanks to the fact that unions had taken over everything in San Francisco – this was the only day-labor job I could find.

Like a sewer rat reconnoitering his daily scraps while carefully discerning between those who understand his sewer life and those who see his existence as the cause rather than the symptom of everything wrong with their city, the hobo and his quite wing woman meekly sought my approval to steal my trash, to which I assure him he'd only be saving me some work. Suddenly recognizing that it is one of his own beneath my yellow vest, he gains confidence in his bottle-collection efforts. His meek attitude undergoes a sudden transformation; he starts to mutter some small talk I would not remember, but what would stick with me for years to come was the moment he set his black garbage bag to the ground with one hand only to raise the other and profess to the sky, "this is *OUR* town". I could tell he was from the east coast –  both by the way he pronounced his vowels and by the shear attitude he strung them together with.

This was the first real clue I got to the nature of what was playing out on the streets of San Francisco. Sure, a couple days of walking around to see the mounds of flesh on so many corners or the blatantly out of place campsites in full view of the public were enough to tell me San Francisco had a homeless problem that was beyond even Portland where I came from, but more than any town I've passed through, New York and Los Angeles included, San Francisco brings to a head the less tangible aspects of the homeless issue. Treating life strictly as a matter of resources would not explain it. In general, it is not a tangible thing easily quantified in 'research-based' policy discussions. Regardless of the fact I'd been well acquainted with the contrasts between rich and poor, it is an aspect of human nature I'd grasp with only a dejected and academic appreciation for had someone attempted to explain it to me when I was growing up in a geographically isolated semi-desert city.  It was only by being homeless in coastal towns that I became fully cognizant of this side of human nature.

It is cultural in its form, but it is not culture itself – it is the friction that arises when two incompatible cultures are forced to co-exist in a geographically confined space. It is NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard) and San Francisco has ever since by me been referred to as ground zero of the NIMBY warzone the west-coast is becoming. Why it hits an unprecedented high in San Francisco might be attributed to at least a few obvious things; it is one of the most desirable places to live in the U.S. so rents are high as are the tempers of those who must pay so much to

live there only to find themselves complaining to the city about the occasional suitcase full of poop on their corner. San Francisco, though not necessarily warm in the winter, is of course a coastal city and has a relatively moderate climate which is conducive to nomads. But what really sets San Francisco apart from a city like Los Angeles is its growth boundaries. I recall walking what must have been no more than four miles from the center of downtown and the city simply cut off in a line beyond which was barren hills while the other three sides of the city are surrounded by ocean. Whereas Los Angeles can conveniently designate an entire section of town to the homeless (and inner-city segregation comes with its own problems) San Francisco has no easy way out of the issue.

In a similar fashion Adolf Hitler never did understand why people of his country hated Jews, until that is, he moved to Vienna.

It is disputable why anti-Semitism has existed for millennia, and certainly some would say it stems from the historical association with Jews as the chosen people of god who have no place to call home, hence, they too find themselves trying to inhabit a place where someone else is not entirely ready to accept their presence. To name but a few notable instances in modern history in which antisemitism arose, there was the Christian Reconquest in 1492 in which Jews and Muslims alike were given the ultimatum to be baptized or to be expelled from Spain. Pogroms in Russia were instigated by the suggestion which worked its way into the popular mind of citizens that Jews were ultimately responsible for the assassination of Alexander II in the late eighteen hundred's, and from this ensued violent riot directed against Jews who had for well over a century been confined by law to living only in certain areas called the *Pale of Settlements*. This helped spark the *Zionist movement* in which the idea of creating a Jewish nation with its own distinct territorial boundaries was born. This political movement is naturally conflated with the millennia old Jewish ideal of being restored to their homeland of Israel, yet Zionism was, in the beginning at least, strictly a political movement which contemplated several regions before ultimately settling on Palestine. One other notable movement towards establishing a Jewish nation was *Jewish Autonomism* in which it was proposed that Jews spread throughout the globe should be legally considered to be members of their own distinct nation, i.e. a nation that is not defined by geographical delineation. This was perceived by some to be the highest form of nation to ever have been conceived (Lange, 2010).

Jews are a people united by their history if not always by their religion. While Jewish scholars and taxonomists alike might disagree with Hitler's conception of Jews as a 'race' they all would likely acknowledge that Jews have a way of positioning themselves to exert a disproportionate influence in whatever country they inhabit (Lange, 2010, Hitler, 1925). This may stem from the need to preserve Jewish heritage despite being scattered throughout the world – a thing which requires the conscious development and maintenance of distinct political, cultural, and economic institutions throughout not just one generation, but many, and such a thing does not happen without accruing some benefits along the way. Whereas a person who is native to a land might see their heritage as something to be preserved passively Jews need to

engage to maintain it. In the process they become what is a more cohesive political/ cultural/ economic force to be reckoned with despite being a small minority in whatever country they abide in.

Anyone who has ever read Hitler's memoir written fifteen years before the onset of World War II would likely agree he was near compulsive about explaining himself on political matters, but beyond briefly mentioning some points such as those described above he did not bother to elaborate overly much on how exactly he came to conclude that Jews were going to subjugate and eventually exterminate the whole of the human race.

It is in Vienna that Hitler was first exposed to antisemitism. While he did not agree with it at first, slowly he began to pick up on things that would not readily occur to an outsider. In his memoir *Mein Kampf* Hitler claimed that newspapers and cinema were all ran by Jews, the German emperor had not been permitted to speak at critical meetings, Jews had introduced prostitution to Germany, and the Marxist social democrats who had worked to gain influence over the trade unions which held tremendous political power in Germany at the time had been infiltrated by Jews. On a cultural level Hitler perceived the notion of having pride in being a German to have deteriorated into an almost shameful thing. More tangibly, After a couple of years of being a front-line soldier in World War I Hitler's enmity towards the Jews took a turn for the worst when he observed that just as the German front was in a position to finish the war and the enemies moral was at a near irreversible low there suddenly arose a political movement in Germany that had been fed by Jewish propaganda for the factories to go on strike and thereby deprive the soldiers of much needed supplies. This, in Hitler's estimation came at the cost of hundreds of thousands of [mostly German[1]] lives and ultimately cost them the war. Many more lives, he asserted, are lost to subtle and seemingly harmless acts of political, economic, and social subterfuge.

Having lived for several years as a poor laborer subject to a cycle of dire poverty, hunger, and usury by employers, he also identified Jews to have played a significant role in this as well, in no small part by their role in 'stock-exchange capitol'. To this end he had been influenced by the ideas of Gottfried Feder who differentiated between loan capital (money derived from interest, e.g. banking) and industrial capital (money derived from the act of trying to make useful things). Feder blamed most economic issues on the idea of interest, for which he argued had the capacity for unlimited gain while industry capitol had a definite maximum point beyond which the amount of capital that could be derived from industrial endeavors starts to decrease, i.e. producing useful things become less profitable beyond a certain point whereas interest only gets more and more profitable. Specifically, in *For the Abolishment of Interest Slavery* (1919) Feder cites the example of Mayer Rothschild – a Jew who became exorbitantly wealthy from fractional reserve lending (banking). Thus, in what became part of the Nazi ideology, useful endeavors

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[1] Jews also fought for Germany in World War I.

that produced useful things and created numerous jobs for the nation are in effect fed on by 'parasites' in the form of financial intermediaries.

Hitler himself had a somewhat philosophical idea of work; any nation must consciously define what the concept means as this will reflect the values of a nation as well as provide a basis for both the nation and the individuals psychological and economic well-being. He believed that certain facets of German society did not allow for those who were innately predisposed to a task to find work that suited them (this is a principle he emphatically argued to be something plainly evident in parliamentary forms of government in which those innately suited for leadership did not rise to a position of leadership). Work should be guided by what is beneficial to the nation, and how an individual contributes should be determined by their innate characteristics. According to his ideas of work, Hitler took the general stance that when men and material were available to produce a product that benefited the country he'd not let financial matters stand in the way. Into this philosophy he adopted Feder's ideas and bypassed banks in international trade to turn Germany's failing economy around at a time when the U.S. was undergoing a massive depression due to banking (Feder, 1919).

While Feder's ideas of abolishing interest may or may not be a comprehensively sound economic ideology, there is much to be said about the relation between banking and industrialization which played a pivotal role in economic issues plaguing the country at the time, particularly for Germany. More than this, the concept of banking will prove to be of much relevance to the cultural shifts which so perturbed Hitler. Accordingly, the subject is worthy of a digression.


**Role of Banks in Industrialization**


*At this stage finance and trade had become his complete monopoly. Finally, his usurious rate of interest aroused opposition and the increasing impudence which the Jew began to manifest all round stirred up popular indignation, while his display of wealth gave rise to popular envy. The cup of his iniquity became full to the brim when he included landed property among his commercial wares and degraded the soil to the level of a market commodity. Since he himself never cultivated the soil but considered it as an object to be exploited, on which the peasant may still remain but only on condition that he submits to the most heartless exactions of his new master,…*

*- Adolf Hitler*

While for a long time the accepted idea in economics has been that the development of banks in some way or another follow patterns of industrialization, recent research has begun to challenge this relation and instead posits that banks play more of a causal role in industrialization (Hellman, 2002, Jaremski, 2013). This was particularly the case in Germany which, in addition to being the home of M. Rothschild, was the birth place of cooperative

banking in which poor people with little to no capital of their own found a means to receive loans for entrepreneurial endeavors.

The general principle of a cooperative bank is that people deposit their money into it, either for long term savings or for short term holding, and this helps to form a pool of money (the reserve fund) from which the bank can issue loans to another individual that it deems trustworthy to repay them. From Hermann Schulze and Frederick Raiffeisen there emerged in the middle 1800's two popular forms of cooperative banks in Germany. In the Schulze model interest on loans granted would be charged on par with other forms of banks that were already in existence, but which were less accessible to poor folks. The reserve fund was held at 10-20% of the bank's capital (assets minus liabilities) which allowed for profits from interest on loans to be distributed to members – poor and wealthy people alike who had bought into the bank. In the Schulze model what people did with the lent money was not heavily monitored. In the Raiffeisen model all profits from interest went back into the reserve fund to fund more loans to members and money lent out was heavily monitored. Thus, while the Schulze model facilitated the creation of a capitalist seeking to profit off interest gained from funding endeavors through the granting of loans, the Raiffesen model was purely concentrated on funding the maximal amount of endeavors – a thing which proved most useful to the rural peasantry whose interest was often to obtain equipment or to build a farm rather than to embrace a new clever way of making money. Schulze banks became more common in cities and were referred to as people's banks, while Raiffesen cooperatives became popular in the country and came to be known as village banks (Whitney, 1922). In both cases a mix of members is required; wealthy depositors provide the bulk of working capital to the bank while poor (or wealthy) members are needed to take out loans to finance their endeavors. So too is a healthy mix of people with various backgrounds pursuing a wide variety of endeavors desirable. In short, with the sole caveat that they be financially responsible, more people with a wide variety of interests produces more safety, and safety is the primary goal of any cooperative bank more than is profit – even in the Schulze bank.

From an organizational perspective, what really makes cooperative banks unique is that the borrower and the lender become one; they are simply members of the bank. This creates a strong incentive to be selective about granting membership, else money be lent to people who will not pay it back and bring the bank to ruin. The principle of cooperation thus requires a locality of people to discriminate amongst themselves; to divide between those who can be trusted to pay their loans and those who cannot or will not. When asked to explain the success of cooperative banking in one of its first trials in Italy a member replied, "We are a hundred persons, who watch one another like spies; it is not possible that one of us should fail in his duty." (Wolff, 1907).

Rather than breaking a small autonomous culture from the outside cooperative [financial] institutions divide it from the inside, and they do so not along lines of rich or poor, but rather according to those who are intrinsically motivated to partake in the tool that is credit and loans.

While redefining the ideal of social responsibility, they also allow for the ideal of individuality to arise; the illusion that the individual picked him or herself up on their own accord by the taking of a loan. Like most bright-eyed progressives who championed the concept of cooperative banking, Henry Wolff, a banking professional and scholar of the late 1800's, considered cooperative banking to be a powerful weapon to bring poor peasants with the requisite desire out of poverty. He was also keenly aware that they require a degree of acculturation;

> *One brief glance at co-operative banks grown up by independent efforts, as compared with others coddled with gifts, will suffice for our purpose. In the former we find co-operative spirit, unselfishness, enterprise, self-reliance, mutual helpfulness and "go;" also natural growth from poverty to sufficiency, from sufficiency to wealth; and always solvency. In the latter, we discover neither self-reliance, nor sound finance, but on the contrary, trusting dependence on others, like that of an unweaned calf upon its mother cow, insatiable cupidity for "more," uncoupled with any sense of responsibility or realisation of duty…Rigorous insistence upon prompt payment is another characteristic feature of our present system....The bank is to make people businesslike, to teach them to calculate, to make them conscientious...It has made uncultured people businesslike and conscientious.*

> - *Henry Wolff*

Today cooperative banks are most readily compared to credit unions, but the same principle they operated on nearly two hundred years ago is to be found in commercial and savings banks that most people deposit money into today. With such a tool to fund new endeavors, it is hardly a stretch to say that banks played a causal part in industrialization and consequently urbanization (the creation of big cities). Mathew Jaremski argues that the development of banks played more than a passing role in industrialization;

> *Banking spurs innovation by funding entrepreneurs with the best chance of successfully implementing technology and production processes. However, picking projects is only half of a bank's job in a developing economy. Discussed by McKinnon (1973), banks are successful when they encourage individuals to lend by providing a safe place to deposit their funds. This leverage is the key to lowering the cost of capital to establishments, especially in developing countries. Therefore, while banks do not directly create physical capital, they facilitate progress by finding and allocating resources to their most productive use.…quality not quantity of banking is important for development, as individuals are not likely to place deposits in risky banks…*

> - *Mathew Jaremski*

In this fashion banks serve as what might be considered the ultimate weapon for gentrification; they help facilitate urbanization itself by dismantling small autonomous cultures and sucking peasants into big industrialized cities where traditional cultures are overtaken by progressive ones. Russia for example, though the country failed to industrialize in many areas due to a number of conflicting

variables (Hellman, 2002, Wignes, 2018)[2], cooperative institutions different in their specific form from Raiffesen or Schulze models but nevertheless similar in that they introduced peasants to world markets 'saved' them from needing to rely on 'middle-men' or 'loan sharks' began to take root starting in the late 1800's. These 'co-ops' helped create a strong social and political divide between traditional minded village peasants wanting to hang on to the 'old ways' and a progressive culture of mass consumerism that was threatening to overtake them (Burds, 1998).

While some Russian peasants were simply lured to the city for want to leave the village life behind, many were also pressured into taking up full-time or seasonal side-work within the cities to support their families. In either case, many peasants found themselves wanting for their lives back in the village after being introduced to the harsh reality of factory work and once the perceptual bubble of city culture had been burst. Many Russian peasants working in the city felt a strong sense of anxiety and lacked any feeling of belonging in these cities (Burds, 1998). In addition to the states interference with financial institutions (the state took an active interest in the social and cultural effects co-ops had), part of what makes Russia an exception to the relation between banks and industrialization is that peasants in Russia were emancipated serfs who still were bound to both their families and their communes, both of which were capable of exerting a strong pressure on those desiring to escape the city by controlling their passport or dis-inheriting them from their land in the village.

Social and economic life were strongly interwoven in Russia, and a peasant faced tremendous pressure to uphold their traditional cultures wherever they went. Peasants would be hired in groups who knew and who vouched for one another while rouge individuals were excluded from opportunities. Employers in turn learned to tap into this social network that developed between rural villages and developing cities; they used it as a means of social control by [for example] hiring groups of peasants when redemption taxes were due – a time when they were particularly desperate for money. Yet it can also be said that many employers were kindred of villagers themselves and used this network to ensure only those who conformed to village tradition gained access to opportunities. Peasants in Russia also used other newly developed forms of mediating institutions such as saloons to combat the cultural threat that co-ops and industrialization posed. These places served as critical junctures for information to be disseminated among them. Often two opposing groups prevailed inside these places; progressives vs. the intensely traditional *Black Hundreds* (Burds, 1998). The Black hundreds were occasionally known for acts of violence and, coincidentally antisemitism. The fact these traditionalists would resent Jews who are considered a foreigner in most lands they inhabit (for the fact their culture remains distinct if not for the fact they are new inhabitants) is on par with how most immigrants to Russian villages were treated during this time, one difference being many immigrants tried to adopt local customs whereas a Jew was perhaps less willing to do so.

Once the principle of banking has taken root within people, Thomas Hellman argues that banks then play a critical role in what was a period of rapid industrialization for Germany from 1850-1870. He fits banks into the 'big push' model of economic theory, arguing that there are several individuals or firms already in existence who need convincing to invest (take out a loan) in an emerging market. Under appropriate conditions, if banks can mobilize this critical mass, then other individuals and firms will follow their example thereby turning a speculative market into a booming one and in the process the

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[2] In a previous work of mine, I covered how co-ops played a significant role in stratification (class division) in rural peasant

bank which facilitated this boom stands to benefit. From here many examples can be had in which banks find incentive not to give out loans beyond a certain point to prevent others from entering the market once it has become sufficiently profitable yet is still controlled by a few who were fortunate enough to get in on the ground-level to form an oligopoly. And of course, governmental regulation of banks can be factored into this producing a perfectly complex area of research to be studied, but the point is that, "*banks did not respond passively to demand for credit*" (Hellmann, 2002). This same critical mass behavior was observed by Henry Wolff to be at play among peasants themselves when deciding whether to buy into this new concept of banks,

> *There is an old prejudice against borrowing....they look upon going to the bank to ask for an advance as an actual "disgrace", and ostensible proof of serious straits. In such cases men of known wealth have more than once usefully intervened as bell-wethers to set the example. After they had broken the ice, their poorer neighbours were found to pluck up courage for the dreaded plunge.*

> -   *Henry Wolff*

While it can be said that banks help us build our societies, the question is whether they do so in anything more than a financially responsible way, i.e. is banking a socially responsible thing? In addition to making obtaining a loan more feasible for peasant classes, what these institutions did is allow individuals to bypass 'the middle man' which brought several of its own albeit more local problems such as opportunistic lending and usury (e.g. loan sharks). Yet just as there will always be someone looking to play the part of a loan shark, so too will there be one who is willing to capitalize on the community in less than noble ways once a loan is made available through a bank, which does not discriminate beyond determining whether a borrower be *financially* responsible.

Say, for example, the community is at a deficit for culture and is in some was socially deprived. This in turn will be an incentive for the loan-taker to turn community into a commodity to be sold to people, likely by weaning them onto alcohol, cheap entertainment, or some form of consumerism, and most always it can be said that shared space in which community might grow comes to be treated as a commodity; in effect human contact itself becomes a commodity. Is this socially responsible? The same might be said to be possible when a borrower must network themselves to find a loan in more personal ways, but this usually means the wealthy members of a community become the lender. In this case the lender is likely to weigh not just the financial benefits, but also the social benefits of the community they invest in, i.e. they will invest in the kind of community they themselves want to live in.

To again use Russian villages of the 1800's as an example, villagers were far more likely to distinguish between insider vs. outsider than they were rich or poor, and [social benefits accounted for] those with the means to grant a loans then have incentive to act as gatekeepers to entrepreneurial/ business endeavors in their local community and they will take an active interest in the shaping it[3].

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villages in Russia (see *Principle of Organization*).
[3] One aspect not adequately addressed in this example of the Russian peasantry is whether truly wealthy land-owning noble classes played any role in the shaping of villages through lending.

How the bank-lending system differs from a system in which people would rely on local and personal lenders is a topic worthy of a detailed study. The most obvious and probably the most decisive factors to be identified is whether these institutions make it easier for people to get loans (and I believe this to be the case) and/ or if they change what people gain access to loans. Those who get financed will have the privilege of shaping their community.

One characteristic of what results from the introduction of banks to a community are however plain enough such that they can be called a definite effect of banking; banks induce a culture in which people learn to consider the issues they collectively face from a very lopsided viewpoint of financial benefits. Evolutionary Biologists speak in terms of social benefits among cooperative species as though they are more than the equivalent of currency to the animals that trade in them; they monitor the social benefits derived from one another's actions in detail. Though we are a 'higher' species there is little reason to think similar mechanism are not still at play within us.

Banks obscure the social benefits in a given transaction. Accordingly, it is no wonder everywhere they are introduced cultures undergo a noticeable shift to what might be called a culture of finance. What I mean to draw attention to is *not* that individuals are consumed by their finances as this is just another way of saying people struggle to obtain resources, and this has been the case long before banks. Instead I mean to point out that people as a collective community come to perceive both the cause and the solution to societal social problems – even define their cultural identities – in terms of finance while the social trade-offs involved get overlooked.

In the Russian peasantry example, the introduction of cooperative lending institutions coincided with a shift in the way that peasants defined their own demographic. Before the introduction of these institutions peasant's differenced according to 'insider vs. outsider', but only after their inception (and after much deliberate propaganda and interference by state officials) peasants began to identify as 'rich vs. poor'. This alludes to the true implication of the term stratification; it is a shift in ideology not just resources.

Curiously, the rise of the financial mindset and steps towards 'progress' alike coincided with the demise of the Russian peasant tradition *pomoch* in which wealthy land-owners were to entertain peasants for one day of the week or month with feasts, spirits, and entertainment on their own estate. *Pomoch* reflected the peasant's conception of land; land-owners had claimed more than their fair portion of what was given for all to use [land], in turn the act of sharing resources was considered compensatory rather than being a selfless act of charity (Burds, 1905). As industrialization and the weaning of peasants onto convoluted financial practices took root, so too did the peasant's conception of the social contract governing land-use become obscured. *Pomoch*, like most things of a traditional nature, soon became a tradition of the past and was replaced with what was now perceived to be philanthropic acts of charity; resources were now given in an act of selflessness rather than to uphold an unwritten social contract.

It is curious to note the connection between charity and a populace's conception of land-use. Take for example America which adopted a progressive mindset from the moment the first colonizers stepped foot on its soil. They came with offerings, yet so too did they come with disease, death, and a clear and vicious aim to grab the land – the original act of charity here in America.

Today the financial mindset manifests in several ways that is evident in the policies we develop today.

Strategies to address homelessness are in large part being based on a minority of those on the streets who incur high medical bills, often because they refuse to take care of themselves. In response to this we develop an incredibly naïve and still costly strategy of trying to wean them onto private housing – the very thing for which it may be argued did not grant them the social benefits they needed in the first place, else they would have found intrinsic motivation to maintain it.

While it is convenient to presume people are simply vagrant and/or cannot afford to take care of themselves, it is not very productive. Consider instead that people are instinctively intelligent creatures which on some level have calculated the social benefits derived from job, housing, and other opportunities such as taking a loan which would in turn restrict their freedoms were they to commit themselves to paying it. Because of this subconscious and instinctive calculation that they could not even admit to, let alone describe, they come to realize that (social benefits accounted for) the social contract is not in their favor; job opportunities do not match their innate characteristics, they lack cultural institutions that are in line with their own identity, and they lack job opportunities that employ them to do anything other than to exacerbate these things. They will in turn allow themselves to fall to the lowest rungs of society where they willingly incur high hospital bills because it is a way of not caring about a system that does not care about their true needs beyond treating them as a mound of flesh to be kept at the correct temperature and calorie count.

Social benefits should be considered a form of capitol, and indeed the term *social capital* has at least made its way into economic literature, but on a local level where it counts our ability to track these social benefits and consequently to affect them has been effectively neutralized through banking which pools a communities powers of investment [financial capital] then dolls it out according strictly to what is financially beneficial but not at all according to what is socially beneficial. So long as they pay the loan, an individual is free to capitalize on the saddest features of the human condition even though it may be to the detriment of the traditions and cultures of the surrounding community they 'invest' in. The resulting progressive culture of finance is also marked by a distinct inability for a people to address their issues from a causal level as social benefits of a transaction can no longer be tracked. Instead a body of people attempts to address social diseases by throwing more money at them.

While this is a rudimentary discussion on the topic of banking, one begins to appreciate how banks fed into some economic and cultural conspiracy pot for the Nazi party.


**Violence in Crowds**


When a crowd obtains social congruence and enough numerical mass there comes a tipping point after which group behavior takes a notable turn for the worst. In his seminal work *Crowds: a Study of the Popular Mind* Gustave Le Bon observed that crowds who crossed this tipping point would then demonstrate a peculiar shift in their otherwise benevolent sense of morality and the usual passive qualities of the crowd would dissipate. Beyond this tipping point the anxiety of social responsibility, of which Sigmund Freud identified to be nothing less than what we've chosen to call consciousness (Freud,

1921), seems to dissipate. The individual's feelings of apathy and powerlessness also fall away as they are overcome by a certainty that nothing is impossible. However intelligent or rational be the individuals who compose the group, they nonetheless revert to a 'primitive horde' whose actions are guided by the simplest of ideas and who can carry out the most atrocious acts once convinced that the source of their ills has been identified in some person(s).

> *Under the influence of the suggestion received they are perfectly convinced, as was the cook referred to above, that they are accomplishing a patriotic duty. They fill a double office, being at once judge and executioner, but they do not for a moment regard themselves as criminals. Deeply conscious of the importance of their duty, they begin by forming a sort of tribunal, and in connection with this act the ingenuousness of crowds and their rudimentary conception of justice are seen immediately. In consideration of the large number of the accused, it is decided that, to begin with, the nobles, priests, officers, and members of the king's household — in a word, all the individuals whose mere profession is proof of their guilt in the eyes of a good patriot — shall be slaughtered in a body, there being no need for a special decision in their case. The remainder shall be judged on their personal appearance and their reputation. In this way the rudimentary conscience of the crowd is satisfied. It will now be able to proceed legally with the massacre ... These instincts, however — as is regularly the case in crowds — will not prevent the manifestation of other and contrary sentiments, such as a tenderheartedness often as extreme as the ferocity....*

> *... When a prisoner is acquitted (by the improvised tribunal) everyone, guards and slaughterers included, embraces him with transports of joy and applauds frantically," after which the wholesale massacre is recommenced. During its progress a pleasant gaiety never ceases to reign...*

> *... At the prison de la Force the victims are stripped stark naked and literally "carved" for half an hour, after which, when every one has had a good view, they are finished off by a blow that lays bare their entrails.*

> -       *Gustave Le Bon*

Le Bon makes several other interesting (or troubling) points about crowds. Crowds can only hold simple concepts, yet intelligence is no metric for determining who is immune to the effects of crowd psychology as it is a mechanism hardwired into the human races instinctive mind. Though crowds have a passing respect for reason and justice, the crowd yearns to be dominated by a tyrant not a hero. And while they may castigate the tyrant once he has lost power only to praise the hero who now stands atop him, they only do so because the tyrant no longer holds power. The accepted beliefs of crowds are not easily uprooted, yet once they are the momentum of their reversal is near impossible to stop (Le Bon, 1896).

By using his innate gifts to expound the foundational aspects of his WELTANSCHAUUNG in the most irrefutable of ways to the public, with shameless use of propaganda, and with unhesitant use of force to defend his party during political rallies Hitler gained the respect of the political world and worked to uproot and replace some of the most foundational ideas of a nation. WELTANSCHAUUNG to him was more like a religion than a political ideology. In the process of perturbing the base of the

nation's foundational ideas, he gained much more than respect. By some intangible quality that few who study Hitler would deny but may admit to only grudgingly, he also gained the love and adoration of [a good portion of] the masses. Perhaps it was this intangible quality which caused the public to open their ear to his ideas in the first place. In either case what Le Bon concluded of crowds, that they'd be '*condemned at the same time to transform all the elements of its civilization*' proved true when they opened their ear to his ideas, and somewhere in the process the docile animal that was the crowd was transformed into a raging beast.

It is however bearing in mind what might be a fundamentally important distinction, namely that most of the psychologists referenced studied domiciled crowds. Years of being involved with homeless 'nomads' has led me to believe there are distinct differences in the ways such a crowd relate to one another when compared to that of domiciled folk. Whereas homeless often must literally must learn to live together, it often seems to be the congregations of domiciled folk which come to be marked by loud noises and violence.

## WELTANSCHAUUNG

Though a soldier and laborer, Hitler was inexplicable drawn to architecture from a young age. Later, as a young man enduring his tribulations he would be a somewhat obsessive student of history. While life experience was busy teaching him that two cultures (or as he perceived it – races) cannot coexist without one endeavoring to subjugate the other, his fascination with history was leading him to the conclusion that Aryan civilizations were the sole progenitors of all the creative and significant aspects of civilization as we know it. Jews he argued, were like parasites who quietly infiltrated such civilizations and subverted them on a cultural and economic level

Like his position on Jews, he did not digress to educate the reader all too much on how he came to these conclusions about Aryan civilizations. Being ever cognizant of his audience and of the psychology which governs crowds he appealed to, perhaps he chose not to risk losing his audience with reductionist facts of history. Then again maybe he knew that history is sufficiently complex such that one can usually make an assertion that is 'close-enough' and then defend it as needed.  And indeed, from a political standpoint this is the superior tactic than is to argue from the standpoint of specifics and hope this will inspire anyone.

While he does not offer an entirely clear definition of Aryan civilizations, it is clear that Hitler implies civilizations with monumental architecture, advanced weaponry, creative art, agricultural tools, governmental structures, technologies, etc. Above all, Hitler asserts that Aryan races possess innate cultural creativity which manifest in the things they create. Imagine today's society only instead of bland cheap modern architecture we had intricate stone-worked buildings as in Rome, and instead of consumerism we had institutions which united people in ways from which cultural traditions could grow rather than generational habits of trendiness – this perhaps is more in line with Hitler's vision of Aryan civilizations.

The term Arya is one that has been around for a very long time beginning with one of the oldest written Indo-European texts, the Rigveda.

Most researchers dispute the idea of 'Aryan races' and instead use the term proto-Indo-Europeans (PIE). One of the earliest PIE civilizations known to Anthropologists is represented by the Bactria-Margiana Archaeological Complex (BMAC) which does in many ways embody what might be called an Aryan civilization. While many anthropologists accept the *Kurgan Hypothesis* in which, as Hitler asserted, these pre-historic European 'Aryan' ancestors spread their culture by violent conquest, some researchers are beginning to favor alternatives to the idea of Aryan culture coming to dominate Europe by ancient violent conquest. Instead they posit that it is more likely to have been a case of influencing groups that had contact with the original Aryan civilizations, i.e. it was a contagion like spreading of culture not a violent conquest of races. To quote Michael Witzel,

> *...mobile pastoralist speakers of early Indo-Iranian and Indo-Aryan entered. The sudden decline of all cultures of the area, from Mesopotamia to the Indus and from Bactria to Bahrain and Oman, at the beginning of the second millennium is suggestive, but it cannot simply be explained by an "invasion of Aryan hordes".*

> *An immigrating civilization joins the local one, transforms it by taking on many of its aspects and then sets in move a recurrent, billiard-like spread of this innovative culture. In the end, no one at the start of the process may be genetically linked to anyone at the end...of the process.*

> - *Michael Witzel*

From this it may be ascertained that there *are* in fact such things as Aryan civilization and culture which spread like a contagion of influence throughout Europe, but the idea of 'Aryan races' is not accepted by most researchers, and the idea of them spreading their culture via violent conquest is now also being disputed. Hitler on the other hand argued that Aryan races were distinct and possessed their own innate characteristics. Furthermore, he believed that though races may intermix, they do a surprisingly efficient job at maintaining the purity of their blood-lines, and that this was particularly true for Jews.

The ancient parable, 'a man's actions will follow his thinking' proved true when the most fundamental guiding principle of Hitler's political program became the idea that ***the basis of any state [government] should be the preservation of the race***. Hitler argued that culture followed race, or in his own words, "culture depends on men, and not the reverse" (Hitler, 1925). Culture and creativity were words used often by Hitler, and what might be said to be another 'iron law' on which he based his philosophy was that ***culture and creativity are innate characteristics that a race either possessed or did not possess, but which they could not simply acquire***.

While the idea of culture being successfully transmitted from one race to another directly contradicts what became one of Hitler's most foundational beliefs which helped form his ***WELTANSCHAUUNG*** (world-view), it is unfortunately a subtle idea that even today is beyond the proof of science. Likewise, Hitler's claim that cultural characteristics are innate to a race is not easily disputed, and it is ideas such as this which, however contentious they may be, make for a viable political weapon. So too does the idea that there should be some metric which defines who a state should and should not prioritize hold a certain appeal to a country experiencing severe growing pains brought on by modern practices of industrialization, banking, and urbanization in what Hitler at least perceived to be a geographically

confined space that did not have the capacity to support the German race in centuries to come, let alone two races trying to undermine one another.

Decades of studying crowd behavior led social psychologists Gustave Le Bon to conclude that civilizations spawn from ideas, and not the reverse;

> *...every civilisation is the outcome of a small number of fundamental ideas that are very rarely renewed...great historical perturbations are the result, as a rule, of changes in these fundamental ideas.... a nation has never been able to change its beliefs without being condemned at the same time to transform all the elements of its civilization'.*

> \- *Gustave Le Bon*

Were Hitler overly concerned with giving a certain definition of his conception of innate characteristics of a race perhaps he'd differentiate between mimicry and genetic qualities. Mimicry would introduce a whole host of things to do with the brain that science is far from understanding. Even in terms of genetics though, there is much we do not know. This in turn opens the door for evolutionary theories such as Darwin's natural selection to be challenged as it may be possible for self-induced mutation to occur[4]. The typical example is a herbivore reaching for a leaf on a tree. In its own life-time it might make its neck longer, but the real question is whether that mutation of the body can be *induced* on a genetic level – a mutation that would then be passed onto its offspring as opposed to random genetic mutation followed by a process of weeding out what traits are most suited for survival (natural selection). Darwin himself had doubts about his own theory towards the end of his life.

To challenge natural selection is to challenge the idea that nature works via 'survival of the fittest' which was another 'iron law of nature' according to Hitler.

It is curious that a man fascinated by and who originally planned for a career in architecture only considered that culture follows man or vice versa, but he made no mention of the possible role that the environment itself might play. Ecology (the interaction of biology with its environment) is a powerful concept which provides somewhat of a middle ground to the issue.

**The Rise of Hitler**

How exactly, one may wonder, could any leader bring such radical views into a relatively modernized world? Hitler was mocked by a good number of people for his views at first, and many did not believe he'd try to implement the things he spoke of. Yet he obviously got away with it. He was able to do so in part because he was a gifted orator who had the right tools to appeal to the prevailing conditions in Germany following World War I. Beyond being acclimated to war and economic struggle, many Germans felt humiliated by the stipulations of the Versailles agreement which pinned responsibility for much of what transpired during the war on Germany and, in addition to disarmament, forced the country to pay reparations and make land concessions. It can also be said that democracy was a newly

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[4] Today bio physicists for example have considered that rules of Quantum Mechanics may be of relevance in the process of DNA and RNA replication as they rely on precise copy/ paste mechanism that ultimately boil down to atomic small-scale interactions between atoms.

implemented system to Germany and many did not even want it. Together these things helped fuel a heightened political atmosphere of engagement and creativity.

Around the time cooperative banks first started taking root in Germany so too did a rise in associationism; people forming various clubs, neighborhood groups, societies, etc. Germany's 'associational fetishism' that arose in the nineteenth century hit a climax in Germany after World War I (Bermann, 1997).

Whereas many social theorists since the time of Alexis de Tocqueville argue that a nations democratic institution are strengthened when citizens themselves are engaging with one another to form their own associations, Sheri Bermann points out this is not always the case, especially in Germany in the 1920's as is plainly evident by the fact that a decade of heightened associational fetishism resulted in the birth of fascism. The development of associations among individuals, she argues, can just as well signal the undermining of political structures governing the greater body of people. Thus the relation between associationism and the strength of the democratic system of government is better perceived as a tool; whatever this yet to be identified relation is, it can be weaponized to strengthen or to weaken democratic forms of government (Bermann, 1997).

> *The nationalist associations… were formed as distinctive organizations within a space which the difficulties and obsolescence of an older mode of dominant-class politics had opened up." They targeted a broad swath of German society and attempted to provide new channels for participation in public life. Many of these groups were not directly "political" organizations, however. Their primary goal was not to participate in the Wilhelmine political system, and indeed, they often defined themselves in direct repudiation of existing political institutions and structures, arguing that they were **Volksvereine** (people's associations) devoted to cross-class solidarity and national unity. Another distinctive characteristic of these groups was that, in contrast to old-style Honoratioren organizations and parties, they placed the idea of popular legitimacy front and center. The Navy League and Pan-German League, for example, broke new ground in terms of mass participation and activism. Both emphasized membership involvement in discussion and decision making, and both were more willing than the Honoratioren organizations to offer "particularly deserving" individuals the opportunity to rise to leadership positions.*
>
> - *Sheri Bermann*

Once they came to power, the Nazi Party would in fact use places of association as 'focus groups' to hone their propaganda. Yet more importantly than how they were used once Hitler came to power is how this associationism opened the door for "particularly deserving" people such as Hitler to come to power in the first place. To this end the U.S. makes for a convenient comparison as it is the only country known to rival Germany in our 'associational fetishism' (Bermann, 1997).

Associationism in America is more than a means of socializing, it is rather an innate method of organizing, i.e. it is a modern manifestation of tribalism. In the beginning associations may start as passive forms of camaraderie, but with the onset of industrialization, technological advances, and an increase in both numerical size and social complexity these associations become political and educational organizational units. This in fact provides a tentative explanation for how the trade unions came to be of such political power in the decades prior to the rise of Hitler.

*In general, voluntary associations Become more numerous and more important as societies gain in size and in technological and social complexity. "The most marked structural distinction between a primitive society and a civilized society," MacIver (1932) claims, "is the paucity of Specific associations in the one and their multiplicity in the other [p. 141]." Noting the complexity of the distribution and form of associations in contemporary social life, Banton (1968) suggests that a general pattern can nevertheless be observed. He states:*

> *Among relatively small and technologically primitive groups, associations tend to be organized for recreation and the expression of distinctions of rank; in larger tribal societies they may exercise important governmental functions, and with an increasing division of labor they tend to be founded for the pursuit or defense of economic interests [p.358].*

*…In addition, however, increasing division of labor and the concomitant desire on the part of occupational groups to pursue or defend economic or occupational interests have led to the transformation of many expressive voluntary associations into highly active instrumental organizations. Writing of the development of the trade association movement in the United States, Truman (1955) asserts that "many of the early groups primarily engaged in 'innocuous and in-consequential social festivities' that indicate merely an increased rate of interaction [p.78]." Industrialization, however, brought*

> *...virtually all of them [to assume] the function of protecting the trade against the rigors of competition and the market, either directly through devices for controlling prices or in-directly through the application of various trading rules [p.78].*

> *- Truman and Banton, as quoted in Bloland, 1969*

What perhaps makes for a pivotal difference between Bermann's assertion that associationism helped give rise to Hitler who in turn decimated democracy is the more specific caveat identified by Bloland that these associations [for them to support a democratic process] must have a degree of overlap with one another. This Bloland argues, is a critical thing which prevents one group from overtaking the other. The end effect is to have a conglomerate of self-interested groups who must learn to cooperate by compromising many of their own interests in favor of singular ones that are shared by other groups. Ironically, because these overlapping singular interests are bound to be numerous as they are transient, this makes any claim to a national ideal somewhat illusory (e.g. the 'American dream' changes in definition every generation, if ever it has really been defined).

*Eldersveld(1958) remarks:*

*"We have operated usually with a 'conflictual' theory, that interest groups pit group against group and thereby exacerbate social relationships and promote tension [p. 188]." It has been a common criticism of political interest groups, particularly, that their commitment to limited, private interests places them in direct opposition to the public interest and to national unity…*

*…Reflecting Simmel's view today, Coser (1956) asserts:*

*Conflict as well as cooperation has social functions. Far from being necessarily dysfunctional, a certain degree of conflict is an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group life [p.31]*

*In addition to the growing tendency among social theorists to accept conflict as an essential element of any social system, **there has been increasing recognition of an important source of constraint** on the expression of conflict among interest groups. Associations are prevented from destroying each other, and from seriously jeopardizing the social order, by the tendency **for their memberships to overlap.***

*- Eldersveld, Simmel, and Coser, as quoted in Bloland, 1969*

Bloland's synopsis is actually on education more so than democratic government, but the two share an intimate overlap as America's educational system is a decentralized one which arose out of a conglomerate of self-interested associations which have come to exert regular influence on federal institutions. After World War II the federal government placed a high value on research in both physical as well as social sciences. Intentionally the federal government availed itself to the expert advice which educational institutions provided and made funding them a priority. While this promoted the general concept of education it did not do so without consequences.

Two (out of four) generalizations Bloland makes is to differentiate between those who associated according to the goal for furthering the cause of their discipline (discipline-orientated associations) and those who championed the idea of education as an institution (institution-orientated associations). As the federal government willingly took on the role of funding education and actively began seeking the advice of researcher's institutional associations worked to strengthen ties between themselves and federal agencies while researchers themselves sought to see the knowledge of their respective disciplines brought to bear on government programs.

 In a way that resembles how tradesmen unionized in response to industrialization, urbanization, and an increase in competition, academicians came to be professionalized; expertise in a given area was

no longer a matter of knowing a given subject, but a matter of possessing the formal degree which officially granted expert status.

Until the 1960's accreditation of institutions was performed by voluntary associations, but [in part] because self-interested associations emerged who were constantly trying to control education to suit their own ends and uphold their own prestige, governmental institutions learned to control the accreditation process by holding funding over the heads of educational institutions, i.e. to be eligible for federal funding an educational institution would have to submit to a federal agencies accreditation process.

Like banks, the concept of educational institutions gained momentum because they were perceived by the public to be tools to serve the public good (Lazerson, 1998). While this claim depends on how 'good' is defined, what education has done has provided a means for people to associate themselves while the role accreditation has played is to provide a powerful incentive for these associations to maintain an overlap.

The result of this evolution of self-interested groups seeking to assure their own interests when combined with enablement from federal agencies has been a distinctive form of bureaucracy; a plethora of institutional bureaucrats who are more preoccupied with tending to the cooperative aspects of their institutions than with the actual content of the issues their agencies supposedly are designed to address – a thing which is compensated for by the newly found authority of the technical expert. While the expert confines his or her sphere of influence to one small [maybe atomic scale] event, there will come a moment [a brief one] in which such an expert will transcend government officials and administrators alike. Yet nowhere in this hodge-podge is anyone entirely free to take a comprehensive stance on an issue, and neither are they entirely accountable for its outcome.

The weakness of such a system which relies on ruthless objectivity while virtually prohibiting any comprehensive ideology from taking root is that humans are subjective creatures who crave ideology, one which account for more than one thing at a time – a WELTANSCHAUUNG which offers a more comprehensive foundational truth on which they may base their identity and actions alike. Hitler was aware of this innate need within people as well as the fact that he could not destroy one WELTANSCHAUUNG without replacing it with another.

While objectivity may be the superior tactic for isolated incidences of pure tactics, it cannot govern a nation of people demanding a higher moral purpose to their actions; objectivity is not an ideology in itself, at least not for many people. But in politics this is how it has come to be used – to substitute for a lack of ideology. In general, Hitler despised this line of thinking, and he did not trust that one who found employment through a university could be trusted to give a non-bias opinion of a democratic state;

> ...*Those whose duty it is to explain what is meant when we speak of the State, hold chairs in State universities, often in the department of constitutional law, and consider it their highest duty to find explanations and justifications for the more or less fortunate existence of that particular form of State which provides them with their daily bread. The more absurd such a form of State is the more obscure and artificial and incomprehensible are the definitions which are advanced to explain the purpose of its existence.*

*...Indeed, it is very necessary to be strictly objective in the study of the institution whose sponsors talk of 'objectivity' in every other sentence as the only fair basis of examination and judgment...*

*...Authority of the State', 'Democracy', 'Pacifism', 'International Solidarity', etc., all such notions become rigid, dogmatic concepts with us; and the more vital the general necessities of the nation, the more will they be judged exclusively in the light of those concepts.*

*This unfortunate habit of looking at all national demands from the viewpoint of a pre-conceived notion makes it impossible for us to see the subjective side of a thing which objectively contradicts one's own doctrine. It finally leads to a complete reversion in the relation of means to an end...to the mind of the dogmatic believer in objectivity, it is an end in itself; and he looks upon that as sufficient apology for his own miserable existence. Such people would raise an outcry, if, for instance, anyone should attempt to set up a dictatorship...because to such sticklers for abstract principles the law of democracy is more sacred than the welfare of the nation. In accordance with his principles, one of these gentry will defend the worst kind of tyranny, though it may be leading a people to ruin, because it is the fleeting embodiment of the 'Authority of the State', and another will reject even a highly beneficent government if it should happen not to be in accord with his notion of 'democracy'.*

*...Whoever wishes to win over the masses must know the key that will open the door to their hearts. It is not objectivity, which is a feckless attitude, but a determined will, backed up by force, when necessary.*

*- Adolf Hitler*

Hitler did not appeal to the objective side of people, rather using his intellect and powers of persuasion he convinced them that a dictatorship would in fact be a superior form of government, and prior to the coming of World War II one could in fact build a case that his fascist ideologies panned out as promised in some respects.

So too can it be said that Hitler's unwillingness to discount what is subjective is not without merit.

Today concepts of objectivity have instilled in politics (if not people themselves) the sentiment that a thing is not worth pursuing until it has been 'proven' by some theory, but just as surely as reductionist science is incapable of describing conglomerate, dynamic, and multi-faceted real-life truths, so too can it be said that humankind would not be here today if they stood around waiting for an 'expert' to tell them whether their instinctive creative impulses are theoretically sound or if they tried to substitute real world observations of their own with second hand observations found in books. The latter should be considered supplemental to the former rather than a substitute.

In this fashion universities have introduced what is little more than a biological breakdown in communication[5] in the sense that people have come to consider observations born out of research to be more legitimate than observations born out of their own inner-experience. The only thing which makes inner-observations less than 'scientifically sound' is that they are not *directly* reproducible, but that does not mean they are not observable. If we fail to inspire one another with our own inner observations – if we fail to play to one another's imagination – then we also fail to inspire one another to attempt to

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[5] As I half-jokingly argued in *Principle of Organization* reductionist reasoning itself can also be considered a breakdown in communication.

reproduce what we've observed, and this effectively neutralizes our ability as people to shape our reality. If subjective inner-observations are designated as inferior to objective research, then what ensues is an objectively creative mechanism that is not guided whatsoever to serve the inner needs of its creators.

As it specifically relates to associationism's role in upholding democracy, Bermann alludes to a groups willingness to open its ears to the voices of its members as a pivotal factor for allowing 'particularly deserving individuals'. If Hitler's memoir is to judge by, then how groups tolerate such a thing as oratory amongst themselves allows for a more specific mechanisms on how associationism opened the door for people like Hitler to come to power.

There is a big difference between the way people associate politically today [in the U.S.] than they did in Germany in Hitler's day. Though the tools of newspaper and even electronic forms of communication were taking effect, the art of oratory was still considered a *thing* for Germans engaging in politics at the local level in 1920's. While radio (when combined with Hitler's oratorical gifts) might account for how Hitler's *group* rose above others, it would not account for how he joined a group and rose in its ranks to begin with.

Beyond the occasional rally in a park where one side might use a megaphone to drown out the opposing group, true oratory has all but died among political life today, at least this is true in most major cities within the U.S. Political engagement at the local level usually equates to short and timed testimony's facing representatives rather than people themselves, and usually at times when others are at work. The exception to this is often local events in which an 'expert' on a given topic is invited to play the designated role of speaker – a thing that is very different from the public opening its ears to one of their own.

In a sense, most grass-roots civic engagement today has come to organize itself around the same principles which have overtaken bureaucratic educational and federal institutions in that they emphasize cooperativity with existing agencies they appeal too over developing their own ideology which they allow to be boiled down to one transient political goal which might prove palatable to other institutions they bargain with, and rather than opening their ears to the oratory to members of the public in hopes they might attract talent to champion the cause, they are seemingly grateful when an expert is handed down to them from above to give a speech – as though being deemed worthy to be an audience is in itself validation they've been heard.

True engagement today has been effectively neutralized in favor of avoiding disagreeableness, even when it is at the cost of effectiveness. Civic engagement has come to take on an incredibly naïve appeal of waiting in line so those who have spent their entire careers waiting in lines can finally have their chance to play orator. Yet such persons who rise in this system of docile social correctness are rarely possessed by ideas which perturb the social and political norms, rather they are creatures of agreeableness first and foremost as is evident by attending any political meeting today in which a good half of the time might be spent on congratulatory butt-slapping while perfectly productive negative feedback is carefully avoided. Neither can it be said that such people rose to any position for their speaking abilities.

Parliaments disgusted Hitler to no end, in large part because they did not facilitate the rise of those innately suited to the task and who were guided by ideology more than social norms.

As Bloland notes, totalitarian governments typically abolish voluntary associations. In Hitler's case boxing makes for a good example. A strong believer that 'a healthy mind can only exist in a healthy body' and an ex-soldier who likely put a high value on the biological grey-zone that organized conflict has a tendency to put the human mind in[6], he wanted to make boxing an official part of educational curriculum. Hence, whereas pugilism in our society today is upheld through voluntary associations [boxing clubs] in Hitler's fascist state it would have been upheld through the state. While I don't think this ideas is without merit, the benefit of such a proposal is that it largely eliminates the conflict of interest that is so strongly at play in boxing at the ground-level where talent is recruited, namely that these gymnasiums serve first and foremost a social function; they become in a sense a local tribe, and finding opportunities [to prepare with the use of sparring if not to gain access to fights themselves] as a fighter inevitably involves learning to navigate this social environment which is inclusive only in terms of membership yet can actually be exclusive in terms of gaining opportunity to prepare for and obtain fights. Yet Hitler was also a big believer in social activities, hence it might be inferred that it was [instinctively or otherwise] his aim to abolish the self-interested nature of associations in favor of a system that did not conflate people's social needs with the practical recruitment of talent; boxing and socializing serve conflicting roles, and it is not without merit to say the two should be separated.

While most people today unthinkingly equate civic engagement to a healthy democracy, this sentiment can be misleading in the sense that most forms of civic engagement, particularly those that prevail in times of peace, are passive ways of engaging, and when they are not passive – when they allow opportunities for members of the public themselves to gain an audience – they are if anything conducive to the undermining of existing political institutions, not to strengthening them.

Hitler frequented numerous political meetings and eventually caught the attention of a rather pathetic upstart group with little in the way of a plan or directive when he gave a response to someone's lecture that left the audience with surprised looks on their faces. In what he considered to be one of the biggest decisions of his life, he opted to join them. With persistent application of his oratorical ability and powers of persuasion, and by hosting meetings for the public to attend which were abject failures in the beginning, he slowly amassed an audience until a tipping point was reached and his audience quickly began to number in the thousands.

Yet he recognized the value of maintaining a relatively small number of core members to the movement, i.e. he differentiated them from followers of the movement. History had shown him that bourgeois classes lack willpower to see any cause through, and it was willpower he knew to be a vital component to the success of his movement.

Cognizant of the fact that crowds were not to be appealed to as would a reductionist intellectual, every attempt was made to relate any digression back to one simple and readily grasped idea. He made it a point to address what seemed to be weak points in his arguments to proactively strip his detractors of their greatest weapon of making him contradict himself – a sure way to lose the attention of any crowd.

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[6] Boxing is neither fight nor flight as evolution conditioned us to but is rather some biological grey-zone called hurry up and wait. It also turns a natural agreement between two individuals to a third part mediated event. Hence, it is not nervousness which makes boxing difficult, so much as it is a feeling of subjugating oneself to what is unnatural.

The psychology of the crowd was something Hitler was most adept at playing to, so much so one might say he was naturally attenuated to the mind of the crowd.

In a most natural way so too did he develop the drive that can move a man to want to so radically appeal to the very belief system of the crowd. He experienced the joy that some people never fully come to appreciate; he found his people, his roots, and his culture.

> *...I longed to be among those who lived and worked in that land from which the movement should be launched, the object of which would be the fulfilment of what my heart had always longed for, namely, the union of the country in which I was born with our common fatherland, the German Empire.*
>
> *There are many who may not understand how such a yearning can be so strong; but I appeal especially to two groups of people. The first includes all those who are still denied the happiness I have spoken of, and the second embraces those who once enjoyed that happiness but had it torn from them by a harsh fate.*

> *- Adolf Hitler*

It was love that moved the most notorious despot, long before it was hate. And the road to fascism was not paved with persecutions so much as it was with witty satire and intellectual cunning. At the foundation of all of it though was the rapture born out of letting one's own individual identity dissolve into a larger one – a feeling that comes to possess a person when they experience it. This feeling that articulated words fail to describe is the beginnings of a tribe, it is the basis of nationalism, and it is the very thing which helps to form nations in times of change, regardless of how individualistic members of such a nation may thereafter perceive themselves. It is kinship.


**Group Psychology and Libido**


There is a certain appeal that psychologist at the turn of the century have which is distinctly missing in much of today's literature. Writers such as Sigmund Freud, Robert Smith, and Gustave Le Bon demonstrate a keen appreciation for crowds that is missing in many modern articles that attempt (somewhat feebly) to simulate crowd behavior in a laboratory then model the outcome mathematically. Freud, Smith, and Le Bon lived in a time in which the dynamics of crowds in their more natural state(s) were more accessible than they are in today's highly organized environment, and it is for this reason that such pioneers are deferred to in favor of modern research. This also has the advantage of reflecting what must have been the academic portions of Hitler's knowledge of the subject.

Sigmund Freud makes an interesting observation that [what we refer to as] the sexual driving force can be satiated either through the attainment of mating privileges or through [non-sexual] union with the group; "the unification of the ego is liable to the same interferences as that of the libido" (Freud, 1921). By 'unification of the ego' he is referring to the dissolution of the individual identity into a collective one; what might be taken as an operable definition for kinship. The implication is that the evolutionary psychological driving force that is most often equated to the sex-drive can in fact be satiated via kinship *or* via sexual union. As might be deduced from looking to groups formed by our closest genetic cousins in which one alpha male will jealously horde the right to mate with females, it makes sense to say that

nature would need to provide some psychological coping mechanism for those who do not obtain mating privileges. Hence the term *libido* will here be considered as a specific manifestation of a more general life-driving evolutionary force that operates within groups, not just a sex-drive that operated within individuals.

One of Freuds most significant contributions to the field of evolutionary group psychology was his analogy of the paternal father in which, like apes, one man within a tribe hoards mating privileges among the females while the rest of the males in large part must satiate their libido through the development of kinship with one another (Freud, 1913). This provides an evolutionary justification for the development of kinship and the general need for us to relate to one another.

Somewhat obvious however, is that there is a big difference between this scheme and the way most people live today. To be sure exceptions exists, but this is outside the moral norm, or what Freud would call *taboo*.

Freud fails to identify any specific mechanism which would account for the transition between 'the paternal father' form of tribalism and the monogamous form of living most experience today. Briefly he suggests that it may have been an advancement in weaponry of some sort which allowed the subordinate males (the brothers) to overcome the alpha male (the paternal father). So too is it a matter of speculation what instigated the males to commit this act of mutiny in the first place. The woman is a typical scape-goat, but one may also argue that the drive for mutiny was pre-existing and all that was needed was some tool which would allow the brothers to overcome the single male lead. The dissolution of the paternal father system with its lopsided mating privileges would naturally obstruct the mechanism so carefully honed by nature in which males [through sexual deprivation] were forced to direct their libido towards the development of a sense of kinship with one another.

Robert Smith, in his analysis of ancient tribes in Arabia, sets forth a line of reasoning that differs from this in the sense that in Arabian deserts the virtual opposite of the paternal father tribal system arose; it was women who had multiple husbands (polyandry). It is however worth bearing in mind that Smith begins his historical study from available archeological evidence, i.e. it is not an attempt to go back all the way to some evolutionary divergence between apes and humans or even cave-men and modern men as Freud's theory was. More so than Smith, Freud relied on deductive reasoning; deducing what must have been the past of humans through modern observations. But in both cases, it can be said that a high degree of inference is required and none of the proposed models can be spoken of with absolute certainty, especially in terms of their historical development.

In the Arabian deserts nomads and tribal systems persisted to a later date than in other regions of the world. Until sometime prior to the coming of Mohamed tribes were reckoned through the female line of descent rather than the male and they were polyandrous meaning women had multiple husbands. Smith argues that women asserted themselves, they had significant leeway to choose their husbands, and were far from being treated like private property as is the common depiction of Arab women in more recent centuries. Property [not necessarily private in form] was inherited through the female line of descent rather than the male. On their part, male members of the tribe served as protectors of the women from any potentially abusive husband and were amenable to the sharing of wives as they were property with one another. Smith posits that nomadic life made it more difficult to confine women, but more than this it was the simple fact that monogamy had yet to develop in these small tribes while survival was still a

guiding principle which, under the harsh conditions that the desert imposed, dictated women and property alike needed to be shared to maintain alliances.

> By old Arabian law booty taken in war was common property of the captors…the group that made war in common was always a kindred group….often the claims would exceed the supply, the division could not be effected without dissatisfying someone, and as partnership in a wife represented nothing repugnant to the feelings of the time, while savages well know the danger of quarrels within the tribe and are extremely accommodating towards their fellow-tribes-men, polyandrous arrangements would naturally occur. In truth we may go further than this; for we have seen ... very clear indications that personal property of any sort is quite a secondary thing in Arabia. In very early times, when kindred groups must necessarily have been very small and continually struggling for existence, no sharply defined ideas of personal property could have arisen; even in historical times, in the hard life of the desert, it is not so much a virtue as a duty for the man who has to impart freely to him who has not, and the poor asks help from the rich not as a favour but as a right. All this points to a state of things in which property was undivided and leads us to think that division began only as the groups became larger, and their substance accumulated.

> - *Robert Smith*

The most significant point in Smiths synopsis however, is that study of ancient Arab history alludes to what was a ***profound psychological and organizational shift during human evolution; the shift from organizing along lines of kinship to organizing according to familial descent***. An extension of this is that fatherhood would be a relatively recent invention as guardianship over children was also reckoned according to who their mother was. Children stayed with the mother's tribe and the tribe as a unit raised children as their own. Even if it could be deduced with certainty who the father was, men were obligated by so called *blood-bonds* which, contrary to what one might at first assume, has nothing to do with familial bonds. The harsh conditions and scarce resources of the desert made it such that forming alliances for defensive and offensive measures was the guiding principle of life in the desert, hence 'blood-bond' implies being bound to spill blood with certain others in the event of a 'blood-feud'. The need for alliances was the primary factor which held desert tribes together, beyond this they were relatively free of obligations towards one another.

Many anthropologists and social psychologists have taken the development of fatherhood and the implications of this evolution on their roles today humans for granted. Anthropologists and primatologist Anna argued that the development of fatherhood likely began about 500,000 years ago when our brains took yet another big leap in size. Modern experiments can show that a woman's interaction with her young activates the limbic system; 'the ancient core linked to affection and risk-detection' while interaction between father and sons peaks in the neocortex which usually corresponds to strategy and problem solving. Fatherhood Machin claims is a response to whatever caused the growth of the human brain – a thing which is responsible for the advent of childhood. You see when our brains became significantly larger than any mammal rightfully should possess, and when we started walking on two legs rather than four, we also introduced into our lives an extra period of helplessness. Whereas most mammals go straight from infant (being fed directly by parent) to juvenile (procuring one's own food) humans are characterized by an in-between stage; childhood in which they can feed themselves, but they

do not acquire their own food. Machin suggests it is this period of helplessness which required males to tie themselves to one woman and take on an added role of responsibility for children (Machin, 2019).

Whatever the underlying cause of the development of fatherhood, it can be argued that a man's attachment to the mother and offspring is a relatively new concept. In fact, the development of fatherhood seems a suitable way of distinguishing between what Smith identifies as familial vs. kinship forms of organization, i.e. ***the beginning of a family as we know it today is a biological father attaching themselves first and foremost to their own child rather than to their tribe***.

Sometime prior to the coming of Mohamed tribes in Arabia switched to a patriarchal tribal system in which women lost a significant degree of freedom and were subjugated by males who began to take on the role of fatherhood as well as to track their lineage, name their tribes, and inherit tribal property according to male descent rather than female. Loosely paralleling this was a rise in the concept of private property among kinsmen and monogamy becoming the prevailing social norm.

From Smith's arguments we can deduce there is a correlation between the development of private property, monogamy, subjugation of women, as well as the transition from kinship-based to familial-based organization. Yet the latter three of these (monogamy, subjugation of women, and family) are easily explained by the first (private property). Two people cannot share mating privileges when they exist in a state of 'mine-ness' – a mind-frame private property requires an individual to take on. Likewise, a life centered around obtaining and maintaining private property would spell the end of any significant degree of kinship. With kinship decimated, the male is bound to place extra emphasis on his woman as the sole outlet for his libido. In this sense the concept of private property is inextricably tied to the consideration of women as private property. Finally, yet another thing that can be attributed to the rise of private property (and the consequent decimation of kinship) is the development of strong familial attachment. When people cannot develop kinship, and when they are already in the habit of marking everything they can off as their own, it is a somewhat natural extension that so too will they mark off as their own whatever is begotten from their loins. When defined in this fashion familial ties are more like a compensatory crutch used to get through life when one cannot meet the more fundamental need of obtaining kinship.

In short, the development of private property provides a suitable explanation for some of the most profound modern psychological evolutionary shifts in humans. In terms of Freud's ideas, private property even provides the tool the brothers would need to overcome the paternal father

While many anthropologists today like to dismiss Freud's theory as they do the very conception of kinship, there are still several researchers who take it seriously (Paul, 2019). The fact researchers overlook the theory is perhaps not unrelated to the fact that much of society is organized firmly around the idea of family, which is the only form of living that is really allowed to flourish, and consequently it is likely the only way of life many researchers know of. As for kinship being overlooked, it is afterall an intangible concept that would rely on experiencing it rather than observing it from the outside. The term kinship as Robert Smith used it implied an instinctive psychological bond that could not be easily labeled according to genealogy. Today this form of kinship is referred to by anthropologists as 'fictive kinship'.

From my own experiences I posit that the distinguishing mark of kinship is it is a psychological bond born out of shared experiences.

Saying that society is organized around families, especially at the cost of the development of kinship is naturally a disputable thing. To this end consider the following question; what institution(s) are there in society today which do not in some way revolve around two things; 1) family or 2) substance abuse? The answer might be sports and religion, both of which will soon be argued to be intimately related to the development of sacrifice and that these are at best compensatory half-measures that do not facilitate the real thing.

The very structure of our cities with the family friendly suburbs surrounding the crammed inner-city life might be compared to a cavalry that got trapped in a bowl and is suddenly ambushed by the enemy above who has an easy turkey shoot; people are *trying* to establish kinship anyway possible – the need is still plainly there, yet this need struggles to manifest in the environment it must grow in as is evident in 'cultural' practices of substance abuse and consumerism, both of which have come to adopt themes of perversion. This [perversion] can indicate either that obtaining mating privileges is the true aim of these practices *or* it may be taken as a symptom that these activities are not accomplishing their true goal [kinship] and hence there results some haphazard, confused, and compensatory cross between attempts at kinship and obtaining mating privileges, the result of which is degenerate practices of consumerism, entertainment, and/ or substance abuse. Of the two possibilities it is the latter that gives an adequate description of a common house-party. All that would be required to explain how such a quirky result might come about is that the development of kinship require things that [an environment overly stifled by] private property contradicts – things like time to acclimate, sleeping in proximity to one another, shared experiences which transcend beer-pong, etc.

The army is a suitable example where such conditions can be found, and it is perhaps no coincidence the army was Hitler's favorite institution from which he drew much of his inspiration. There is however the complication that many in the army remain psychologically if not physically tied to their families, and this perhaps inhibits kinship from taking root on any profound psychological level. Hitler's parents both died by the time he had entered the army.

Freud considered the paternal father analogy to be his greatest contribution to evolutionary psychology, and  in his day the idea of the paternal father was widely received because it is a fundamentally simple idea that explains so much; mankind, without the discipline born of sexual deprivations, has lost his ability to direct his libido towards the development of kinship and he instead lives in a perpetual state of viciously labeling what is his, targeting whoever has the most abundant mating privileges, and disposing of whoever poses a threat to what property and mating privileges he has amassed for himself.

Underlying this pervasive jealousy is a sense of guilt. While it was jealousy amongst the brothers which incited them to overthrow the paternal father, there remained a sense of guilt for killing the man they loved and admired. ***To remit themselves of guilt the practice of sacrifice arose***, and this, Freud posits, is a working theory for how totemic forms of tribalism (tribes who identify themselves with an animal) came into existence.

This conception of sacrifice, the more one thinks on it, is a powerful tool to describe something that manifests so often in human behavior. When one carefully distinguishes between the need for people to remit themselves of any sense of guilt and seeking solutions to a given issue by objectively acknowledging everything which led up to it – their own actions included – the concept of sacrifice (the drive to find a means to remit oneself of guilt) manifest recurrently in politics. So too is it a tentative explanation for conceptions of God's; the paternal father becomes the god, the feeling of guilt becomes

sin, and the act of sacrifice[7] becomes repentance which frees one of their sin. In this way Freud attributes to whole of the development of society to what he calls the *Oedipus complex.*

Freud's reasoning was in part derived from the fact that many of his youngest patients seemed to project both their admirations and resentments for their fathers onto animals. This, Freud asserts, represents an innate jealousy that lies in men; they are jealous of the man who has secured mating privileges with the woman who gives a male child his first conception of the sexual union – his mother.

For the sake of relating these ideas to modern application, thus far two tentative assertions have been made; 1) the development of private property (e.g. individual housing which separates people) is a suitable candidate for the tool that Freud states would be needed to overthrow the paternal father system and 2) the switch from kinship to familial systems of organization and the subjugation of women both share some definite relation to this.

Smith's ideas after all boil down to a matter of scale rather than any fundamental shift during human history; the seeds to whatever became the catalyst for switching to familial kinship were already in place, it was only a matter of these seeds growing roots.

Again, none of this can be spoken of with certainty. As such a twist to Freud's scheme will now be considered.

It was not a case of the paternal father jealously hoarding mating privileges to satiate his sex-drive, rather the paternal father enjoyed surrounding himself with the feeling of kinship more so than anyone else. Were it not for his hoarding of mating privileges the brothers would be deprived of discipline and consequently the kinship he so loved to surround himself with never would have developed in the first place; the father hoarded privileges out of love for kinship and instinctive preservation of it. But of course, one may just as well choose to define this as sexual jealousy as it is questionable whether there is some fundamental difference.

Without discipline in place those who take the helm in the ensuing society are the brothers who have yet to learn to master their libido in any way that facilitates true kinship, but who only know how to seek its release through submitting to an endless chase of their own mating privileges and private property to facilitate these privileges.

Why the brothers would opt for a life of such inner turmoil might be blamed on the circumstantial development of private property. Say for example a disease forced prehistoric hominids to leave the forest and inhabit the desert which required they start building individual shelters. On the other hand, it might be attributed to some instigating force that pushed the brothers to adopt what was contrary to how nature evolved them up until that point, such as a woman who understood that men do not organize according to intelligence but according to libido. By cutting the lifeline of kinship, the entirety of the tribe's life-force would then be directed through her. She convinced the brothers to take what is rightfully theirs by taking to the desert where they would be free to establish a sedentary life of private property and where she would avail herself to them.

In this fashion the woman put the brothers in a vicious leg-lock of private property through which they could not see any means of releasing their libido life-force but through her legs, and to this day she

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[7] It is interesting to note that the concept of sacrifice originally meant little more than an act of fellowship between deity and worshipers (Robert Smith, as quoted in Freud, 1913).

uses such an unnatural union between property and mating privileges as a leash to force the brothers to do her will. And she traded in her liberty to do it; with no outlet for their libido but a woman and being by now entirely governed by the concept of property, the man treats the woman as property as well.

With kinship all but decimated along with the paternal father's ability to discipline future generations, it is from this set-up the domesticated man emerges; an addict of private property with mere childish control over his life-force who will trade in his very freedoms just to uphold his addiction. He readily blames anything that plagues him on everything *but* his addiction to property to remit himself of the guilt. Being an undisciplined entity, or at least one who has become ignorant of the ways in which he may master his life-force, he struggles to differentiate between what he wants and what he needs. He uses his attachments to family as a crutch to see him through the landscape that is devoid of all kinship, and these attachments will dictate most significant decisions he makes in life while sinking his perspective to the realm of what is possible only within the framework of maintaining family and property.

While there may come a day when some women seek to regain their liberty, few will be willing to give up their most precious abode or their amazon shopping cards to do so. With the disease of 'min-ness' that private property instills in the human psyche still wholly at play, she will accomplish none other than what is the next major progression for mankind; the deterioration of *both* the family unit and kinship alike.

Instinctively the domesticated man knows his ability to escape this reality is in some way tied to the development of kinship, yet he cannot seem to find any reason to come together with his brothers or his sisters without some sort of sacrifice being performed. As civilization swelled in its numbers man's sense of guilt diffused and as time progressed he simply forgot that kinship ever existed. Accordingly, he perceived nothing to feel guilty about, yet he still felt the void left behind by the death of kinship and his daily experience came to be marked by bouts of melancholy. His answer to this was to conceive of various forms of entertainments. In this fashion, sacrifice evolved into religious ceremonies and family-friendly sporting competitions – reprieves from the unnatural state induced by his addiction. They are hollow attempts at obtaining true kinship, and they are marked more-so by book-reading ceremonies, animal mascots, and loud noises than mental intimacy and inner-satisfaction.

While this attempted description of how sacrifice evolved to modern day sports and religious ceremonies may seem yet another far-fetched scheme, Anthropologists David Young notes that the Olympics likely began with sporting activities used as peripheral acts of entertainment among members of the cult of Zeus in ancient Olympia – a cult which in centuries before the advent of the Olympics had been known for constructing altars for animal sacrifices (Young, 2004). Note the connection between sacrificial meeting grounds being a central part of early civilizations and the roles that super-dome sports complex or magnanimous churches play in today's society.


**The Shaman**


*I told 'em fight back, attack on society*
*If this is violence, then violent's what I gotta be*
*If you investigate you'll find out where it's comin' from*
*Look through our history, America's the violent one*
*Unlock my brain, break the chains of your misery*

*This time the payback for evil shit you did to me*
*They call me militant, racist 'cause I will resist*
*You wanna censor somethin', motherfucker censor this!*
*My words are weapons and I'm steppin' to the silent*
*Wakin' up the masses, but you, claim that I'm violent*

- *Tupac Shakur*

One researcher's adjective stood out to me when describing the effect that Hitler's speeches had on people; shamanism. To my surprise shamanism is a real thing, or at least has come to be considered a legitimate field of research.

The term Shaman is yet arbitrarily defined, but there is a definite common thread that arises throughout human groups in the sense that [from an outsider's perspective] what seems to be a mentally deranged individual starts dressing funny, they perform strange rituals, and use symbology to the point of weaponizing it. They perform healing rituals and cast out demons, and sometimes they do the opposite by invoking curses. Shamans in many parts of the world have undergone a period of persecution beginning about a century ago[8] and a resurrection of research on the topic has only occurred relatively recently (Pratt, 2007).

Considering that genetic expression is just as much a part of evolution as is selection, so to might it be said that culture and kinship are every bit as important as resources and mating privileges. Here it is argued that Shamans fulfill the role of protecting cultural identity; they awaken a cultural spirit in [their] people to remind them that there is more to life than what can easily be measured, and they appeal to the fact that much of maintaining cultural identity relies on appealing to perspective itself. This in turn requires a high degree of empathy which is common if not requisite trait for Shamans.

Ian Wickramasekera notes that people who are easily hypnotizable are also highly empathetic and adept at role-playing, both of which require them to possess a heightened ability for 'perspective taking' or what many researchers refer to as role-taking (Wickramasekera, 2015).

Use of the word 'hypnotism' here does not imply one individual coming under the spell of a superior will, but an entire group coming under a sort of spell; it is a social psychological effect not an individual one. Whereas Sigmund Freud considered hypnotism to be nothing less than one in the same as group formation (Freud, 1921) Le Bon instead uses the terminology of *suggestibility* of individuals and *contagion* within crowds. What makes an individual susceptible to the suggestion of an idea is unknown, both in Le Bon's time and in ours, but if it were understood it would explain a whole lot. Contagion Le Bon likens to hypnotism; the same way a person [supposedly] under hypnosis demonstrates a high degree of suggestibility to a given command, so too do members of a crowd become suggestible to one another creating a contagion effect in which individuals begin to sacrifice their own individual interest to that of the collective one. In this sense hypnotism is not used to imply a single individual entering a heightened state of suggestibility by some hypnotizer, but an entire group doing so. Hypnotism in the individual sense is a questionable phenomenon that many disputes the existence of, but acknowledging its existence among crowds it is much less disputed. It does however become a mystery who exactly is doing the hypnotizing; the person appealing to a crowd or is it some conglomerate effect the crowd has on one another?

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[8] It is interesting to note that persecutions of Shamans in Russia coincide with a number of cultural shifts going on around the 1920's.

The heightened sense of empathy in a shaman gives them a keen appreciation for the connection between humans and the land or animals which surround them, and it is they who usually connect their people's identity with these things[9]. It is by using symbology that a shaman sets up boundaries to protect his or her people from evil spirits – a thing which might be interpreted as defining a cultural boundary.

But healing is the primary role of a shaman, and it is primarily with the use of words that shamans perform their healing. Possessed of an acute appreciation for the fact that much of human suffering cannot be accounted for by considering resources alone, the shaman may perceive life to be more of a struggle than others. They then seek to heal (or hurt) the human condition through affecting perspective with their use of words

> *Shamans do not cure disease; they seek to construct a life world in which disease has lost its meaning….disease refers to biological or psychological malfunctioning, while illness refers to the patient's experiences and perceptions…that they have been ill themselves gives them an intuitive sympathy for the suffering of others and lends them emotional credibility as healer…opening an additional explanation for shamanic healing; it can be seen as a form of logotherapy, a therapy that works by restoring meaning…shamans replace the chaotic, unbalanced, inexpressible suffering of a patient with orderly, balanced, grammatical, and eloquently expressible states…*

> *…In magical healing one indicates to an illness that it should leave the patient. A shaman does more. With her words, which are her power and her tools, she creates both the illness and the disease, creates the body of the patient, and creates the world in which her patient experiences relief. A shaman's language does not attempt to describe how things are. It determines how the world will be. Words shape and give substance to the accidents of the external world. The right words create the world anew, curing the victims of a stale, deteriorated world; healing is thus an aesthetic endeavor. A shaman, to heal, battles entropy, resisting the inevitable accelerating descent of the world into chaos…*

> *…for Navajo theories of language; "The symbol was not created as a means of representing reality; on the contrary, reality was created or transformed as a manifestation of symbolic form. In the Navajo view of the world, language is not a mirror of reality; reality is a mirror of language".*

> - *Gregory G. Maskarinec, as quoted in Pratt, 2007*

Shamans appeal to intangible things, and they do not speak of a pre-existing truth, rather they create it. Humans are subjective creatures governed by the intangible, and it is through such mediums they are affected. While objective science has the convenience of isolating one event at a time in objective reality, 'real life' is a whole science in the sense that all these details must be accounted for and changing even one of them affects every other. Only the intuitive mind can perform such bewildering calculations so as to affect the very perspective people see the world with, and this is the art of shamanism.

When a natural shaman arises, the need for such a thing is realized by people. Upon the shaman's demise, there then arises an anxiety among them (Pratt, 2007, pg.108), and perhaps this is how and why

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[9] Note the connection to totemic tribalism.

some cultures come to formalize the role of the shaman, even at the risk of labelling one a shaman who is unfit for the role. Initiation often requires an individual to first undergo a period of deprivation. Often, they will take off to the desert or forests with an elder shaman for months at a time where, in addition to the occasional psychedelic drug use which helps induce the near universal shamanic trance, they will undergo a period of abstinence. In some cultures, a shaman is even required to vow a life of abstinence in which case the shaman is only allowed 'heavenly' experiences of sexual ecstasy.

There are also prophets which usually arise in response to the cultural subjugation of one group by another. The prophet will instruct their people on how to endure the tribulation while setting forth a prophecy of a coming messiah who is to deliver them from the clutches of oppression and restore them to their original way of life. While this all sounds very familiar to anyone who has read the bible, so called messianic movements are known to occur in several isolated cultures large and small and throughout history up to the near present day.

One relatively recent example is two prophets that arose in response to forced acculturation of Native American tribes in the late 1800's. Indians had been stripped of their political autonomy and in 1889 president Harrison even made forced acculturation an official policy. Children were 'adopted' and separated from their families only to be placed in ruthless boarding schools where they were 're-educated' in ways that made them amenable to adopting American progressive values (Pratt, 2007, pg. 120). In response to events which had been occurring de facto for decades, chief Wodizob contrived the *Ghost Dance* which spread rapidly from Nevada to California and Oregon. He prophesized that the Ghost Dance would one day make all the white people who did not opt to join them disappear.

Did Adolf Hitler play the part of a shaman? Much of what motivated him was the fact he possessed a keen appreciation and strong need for things like culture and kinship, he then strived (and often successfully so) to nationalize the German people with these things; to unite them and make them proud of their heritage in a time when their identity and culture had been trampled on. Many who have read his memoir might agree that he possessed more than an academic awareness of the psychology of the crowd. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler treats oratory like the most intricate science; the most insignificant features of a room he perceived to make for a decisive outcome, the time of day would affect whether a stronger will could be asserted onto a lesser one to influence their thinking, he changed his appearance according to the situation, and he was keenly aware of the effect the surroundings themselves had on both the speaker and the audience; "There are rooms which leave one cold, for reasons which are difficult to explain." (Hitler, 1925). These things allude to a heighten sense of empathy, and indeed Hitler is known to have been so preoccupied with the impressions being laid on the mind of the masses that it would cause him to make severe military blunders (Speer, 1969). Oratory to him was about changing the inner-most perceptions of the individual, not just refuting factual details, and few seem to dispute his prowess at shifting the foundational ideas of the masses.

*Not infrequently it is a case of overcoming ingrained prejudices which are mostly unconscious and are supported by sentiment rather than reason. It is a thousand times more difficult to overcome this barrier of instinctive aversion, emotional hatred and preventive dissent than to correct opinions which are founded on defective or erroneous knowledge. False ideas and ignorance may be set aside by means of instruction, but emotional resistance never can. Nothing but an appeal to these hidden forces will be effective here. And that appeal can be made by scarcely any writer. Only the orator can hope to make it.*

- *Adolf Hitler*

There is at least one practice that shamans have been known for which Hitler failed to adopt; taking on a transgender identity. Yes, the concept of a third gender or mediator between genders goes back a long, long time. Shamans in Siberia have been known to identify so strongly with their female spirits that they undertook a complete and constant transformation by wearing women's clothes and performing the tasks of women. Others maintained their identity as men but simply adopted certain feminine aspects when the occasion called for it, as if taking on the role of a woman produced some desirable effect on those who surrounded them (Pratt, 2007, pg. 133).

*** Insert: The lost Scrolls of John ***

## Shamanism in Homeless crowds

To relate the concept of shamanism to the modern issue of homelessness (nomadism) vs. domestication, shamanism is a social variable that has gone completely overlooked in homeless crowds as well. While full of ground-level observations a researcher could benefit from, the majority of homeless are liable to conform to the most unenlightening epithets to describe these observations. Whenever I have a discussion with a homeless person about issues it feels as though I must remind them that such a thing as positive community *is* possible out here, that it has been deliberately targeted, and that the development of such a thing can have the most profound impact on some of the drug use and degenerative behavior we observe on streets today. Few disagree, yet they need to be reminded, and it is not usually the case one prevails within their ranks with the right words to shape their dispositions and stick around for long. Neither do I see this as any coincidence. When nothing but isolated pissed on sidewalks or prison-like shelters are made available for places in which homeless community might grow then such capable people will be the first to separate themselves from the rest.

A shaman gives words to the inner-struggle people experience, and in so doing frees them of the perceptual hell that they are the source of their ills rather than what they've been subjected to.

As I allude to in *Rise of the Fantastic Thousands*, how I perceive it to work is as follows; some idea (the suggestion) which provides a working theory that adequately describes what the crowd has observed must first be conceived in the shaman's mind. The shaman then plays the part of attempting to spread the suggestion to produce contagion – a process which can be obstructed by either the lack of abilities of the shaman or by some other factors to do with the environment or the crowd itself.

What might be called a positive community 'vibe' or 'cultural confidence'[10] which occasionally takes root in homeless crowds is what Le Bon would call a contagion effect. The question is what is the nature of the suggestion(s) which ultimately cause it? Unfortunately, these factors of suggestibility and their mechanisms of spreading are subtle things. Even for someone who has spent years among homeless crowds deducing what exactly makes the difference between a positive vibe and what is more commonly observed seems to be a subtle thing that is hard to identify.

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[10] See *Principle of Organization.*

When one begins to pay attention to local events and politics it also becomes clear that subtle manipulations of the environment play a decisive role against the homeless; a park that served as a critical source of community for the homeless gets closed down, planters are placed to keep people from sleeping (especially in groups), or even just a fence which shifts the flow of foot traffic – all these things produce an effect. Strangely it can be said that it seems to be the positive community vibe which usually gets targeted more than the homeless themselves.

Whatever these factors of suggestion are, I posit that their understanding would have a most enlightening effect on homeless research and on the human species in general. Yet rather than get more and more detailed on specific environmental and social variables research keeps getting twisted around to suit social norms or serve political agendas rather than acknowledging what should be a plain truth; it (nomadism) is a fundamentally different way of life, one that will not be 'solved' but which at best we might find a way to accommodate.

When shamans are cut off from the community there will come a corresponding shift in culture as the gatekeeper to culture is no longer present and the wolves now enter at will; the people are convinced of rather shallow epithets which paint a picture of them being the problem rather than the forces trying to subjugate them. Shamans are not the cause of culture, but merely its defenders.

## Did Hitler Kill the Jews?

An unfortunate byproduct of Hitler's ability to appeal to 'hidden forces' might be that  Nazi soldiers were often described as performing their atrocities not because they were *ordered* to, but because they *wanted* to.

Yet in attributing guilt for what resulted one should carefully distinguish between the need to assign guilt and the subconscious need for us to remit ourselves of it. Have you ever felt a primitive impulse of anger that rose up telling you that in an honest world you would bury someone for the things you 'knew' they were responsible for yet could never prove in any way that either a court or people themselves would care to hear? Now imagine those people suddenly did care, and that same impulse was now being magnified and reinforced by tens of thousands of other people being rallied by the Michael Jordan of politics. My point is that the Holocaust is a thing which *evolved* out of both deeply buried urges within people themselves when combined with specific circumstances. What Hitler did was play the role of a catalyst.

The inner turmoil I myself have struggled with in writing this essay is that Hitler, even in his writings, leaves an inspirational imprint on the human psyche of many who study him. Denying this effect serves little purpose beyond remitting ourselves of the inner feeling of guilt that is perhaps a reflection that we know it is the crowd that is the real beast, and not some conveniently labeled individual who simply gave the crowd free reign to their inner-most pre-existing and deeply buried sentiments. Arguably, this is exactly what the fascist system of government did.

While today Fascism is often portrayed as a strict chain of commands that can conveniently be traced back to the first link, the truth is it Fascism was a rigid chain of authority intended to facilitate the 'creativity' of those who rose within its ranks, not necessarily a rigid system of commands to be handed

down by a chain of robots. True, when Hitler took an interest in something his word became law, but the question is whether Hitler ever took an active interest in the development of ground level events or simply looked the other way while others allowed things to evolve as they did. As the war progressed and Jews started being exterminated en masse Hitler became increasingly isolated from such ground-level events. He even cut himself off from German soldiers and would hardly bother to acknowledge their presence on the rare occasion he accidently availed himself to them on an individual basis (Speer, 1969). Though it may be a stretch, it is not impossible that he lost a degree of respect for the things which had transpired.

Hitler found some very simple ideas which explained so much in so little and which could not be easily refuted. He then weaponized his intellectual cunning and oratorical gifts to relate nearly the whole of the German peoples struggles back to these simple ideals. He was very conscious of the nature of the crowds he appealed to, and he strategized accordingly. In effect, he acted as a hypnotist who put the crowd under a spell, but always it must be remembered that it is the crowd which opened itself to such hypnotism, and it is by the quirks of [domesticated] crowd psychology that foundational ideas rarely get shifted without resulting in violence of some kind.

The question which now plagues my inner sense of 'good' and 'evil' as well as my perception of where I stand in between these things is this; is it the person who provides the catalyst for such atrocities to occur who we should be wary of, or the innumerable small acts in the crowd themselves which accumulate to provide the necessary ingredients for anything to be catalyzed? Is it not strange that two thousand years ago a shaman arose who predicted the very apocalypse and people since have killed in his name and to this day they worship him, yet Hitler – who tried to rid Germany of the Jews in non-lethal ways throughout most of the 1930's and who was not the instigator of World War II – is considered the very embodiment of all that is evil on this earth? And how convenient is it that this evil must be specific to the German people of Hitler's time while members of allied nations then and now castigate everything with a swastika?

Obviously, Hitler did not kill millions of people by himself. In fact, according to his lead architect Albert Speer he never once visited a concentration camp. In his memoir *Inside the Third Reich* (1969) Speer makes no mention of orders revolving around concentration camps, and in most social events discussion of political matters was considered strictly taboo. Though there is an obvious conflict of interest for Speer who was known as an otherwise objective minded exception to Hitler's band of fanatics, it must also be recognized that history is written by the winners, and Speer's account provides one of the most up close and personal accounts of Hitler during the years of World War II.

And though playing dumb while millions of Jews are unceremoniously slaughtered is hardly any excuse, my aim is not to remit Hitler of guilt, but rather to suggest the charges against him are perhaps more accurately ones of failing to interfere with the way things were developing, not himself willing them to develop in the fashion they did. I feel the urge to more than label Hitler as so many who make their careers off of him do, rather I want to *understand* him. To do so will require an attempt to empathize with him, and this may require a dip into the realm of what is possible even though it may be improbable. Admittedly, it requires a healthy imagination to see past all the events that are by now shrouded in propaganda, but when one comes along who is the exceedingly rare combination of being a philosopher, politician, and shaman and he leaves in his wake an inexplicable sense of inspiration that feels so *right*, rather than pretending it wasn't, one should strive to understand how it resulted in something so *wrong*.

First off Hitler had what even the objective minded Speer described as an almost irresistible hypnotic power over individuals, and it is this very power he used to rise to a position of power.

*It seemed as if he were candidly presenting his anxieties about the future. His irony was softened by a somewhat self-conscious humor; his South German charm reminded me agreeably of my native region. A cool Prussian could never have captivated me that way. Hitlers initial shyness soon disappeared; at times now his pitch rose. He spoke urgently and with hypnotic persuasiveness. The mood he cast was much deeper than the speech itself, most of which I did not remember for long.*

*Moreover, I was carried on the wave of the enthusiasm which, one could almost feel this physically, bore the speaker along from sentence to sentence. It swept away any skepticism, any reservations. Opponents were given no chance to speak. This furthered the illusion, at least momentarily, of unanimity. Finally, Hitler no longer seemed to be speaking to convince; rather, he seemed to feel that he was expressing what the audience, by now transformed into a single mass, expected of him. It was as if it were the most natural thing in the world to lead students and part of the faculty of the two greatest academies in Germany submissively by a leash.*

-  *Albert Speer*

Napoleon Bonaparte, though he did not place nearly as much emphasis on oratory as did Hitler, was known to have been in possession of a very similar power. Le Bon cites one example which makes clear the effect Napoleon had on people;

*The generals of division, amongst others Augereau, a sort of swashbuckler, uncouth and heroic, proud of his height and his bravery, arrive at the staff quarters very badly disposed towards the little upstart dispatched them from Paris. On the strength of the description of him that has been given them, Augereau is inclined to be insolent and insubordinate; a favourite of Barras, a general who owes his rank to the events of Vendémiaire who has won his grade by street-fighting, who is looked upon as bearish, because he is always thinking in solitude, of poor aspect, and with the reputation of a mathematician and dreamer. They are introduced, and Bonaparte keeps them waiting. At last he appears, girt with his sword; he puts on his hat, explains the measures he has taken, gives his orders, and dismisses them. Augereau has remained silent; it is only when he is outside that he regains his self-possession and is able to deliver himself of his customary oaths. He admits with Masséna that this little devil of a general has inspired him with awe; he cannot understand the ascendency by which from the very first he has felt himself overwhelmed.*

-  *Taine, as quoted in Le Bon, 1896*

Consider now that the age leadership[11] and now even kings has passed. We instead live in an age where political 'leaders' thrive by giving people what they want. The problem is people as a group have steadily been losing opportunities to figure this out. For many political engagements today means a hard-earned election years' worth of Facebook comments followed by the strenuous act of checking a

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[11] I personally don't think this term has much significance when applied to anything other than a relatively small group of people (e.g. a tribe).

few boxes. To play politics in anything other than a passive fashion is to affect the phenomena of suggestion and contagion, yet people themselves have little opportunity to engage in any meaningful way that would allow them to do this.

There seems to be some threshold that is defined by sheer numbers or some other subtle factor at play in industrialized cities which, once crossed, a body of people lose their ability to influence one another beyond forming their own socially selective groups within the greater hegemony. Hitler recalled being frustrated with how he'd deliberate with his fellow workers in the trade unions – sometimes for hours – in effort to get them to see his reasoning. Though he'd often be successful, the next day they would revert to their original opinion which was in line with the rest of the workers. Often in his memoir Hitler would refer to the 'stupidity of the masses' and he expressed such frustration that he held little hope for this to ever change.

Sooner or later things of this nature will force a politically motivated individual to accept that to play politics is to play to the psychology of what is by now a conglomerate hodgepodge of crowds, and to affect the phenomena of suggestibility and contagion within them, or as Le Bon would say, 'A knowledge of the psychology of crowds is to-day the last resource of the statesman who wishes not to govern them — that is becoming a very difficult matter — but at any rate not to be too much governed by them.' (Le Bon, 1896). Accordingly, such an individual will sooner or later begin to appeal to these crowds rather than the individuals which compose them, but as we know by now, crowds can only hold simply concepts, and though their foundational dispositions are not easily moved, once they are the momentum of their reversal is even more impossible to stop.

The point in all of this is that it becomes entirely plausible to entertain the notion that Hitler was forced to 'choose' between the lesser of two evils; allow some imminent cataclysmic event (or gradual subversion) to progress or do whatever is necessary to stop it, including giving the crowd he possesses free reign to dispose of their problems in their own way. It is worth noting that the workers Hitler associated with were deeply anti-Semitic, and in this sense performing the act of hypnotism that was required to achieve whatever were Hitler's true ends were also required empathizing with this vicious hatred for Jews. This empathetic mimicry is in fact another characteristic Hitler and Napoleon perhaps shared;

> *The power of conquerors and the strength of States is based on the popular imagination. It is more particularly by working upon this imagination that crowds are led…Moreover, all the great statesmen of every age and every country, including the most absolute despots, have regarded the popular imagination as the basis of their power, and they have never attempted to govern in opposition to it "It was by becoming a Catholic," said Napoleon to the Council of State, "that I terminated the Vendéen war. By becoming a Mussulman that I obtained a footing in Egypt. By becoming an Ultramontane that I won over the Italian priests, and had I to govern a nation of Jews I would rebuild Solomon's temple."*

> \- *Napoleon Bonaparte, as quoted in Le Bon, 1896*

One need not search for long to find various ways in which Hitler's proposition of 'removing the Jews' has been interpreted to hold lethal implications since the early 1920's when Hitler was first introduced to anti-Semitism, but we must also acknowledge that throughout most of the 1930's the Nazi

party had in fact sought the literal removal of Jews to other countries. This endeavor ended decisively with the Evian conference of 1938 in which all the allied countries – even those such as the U.S. and Russia with enormous amounts of land to spare – chose not to accept Jewish refugees despite their growing persecutions in Germany. It is easy to imagine this put Hitler in a hard spot; to continue to be the hero who proclaimed Germans needed living space for their own kind or to back down from his promises to the people, many of whom by then considered him a virtual hero for having turned many of their economic woes around and for the other qualities he possessed.

Having secured assurance from Stalin that Russia would not interfere if Hitler continued to pursue his quest of procuring living space by conquering Poland, Hitler proceeded to do so. He did not want conflict with the U.S. France or Britain, rather he thought that even France and Britain's assurances to defend Poland should he invade would perhaps roll over or more likely they would settle for playing a supply-support role rather than actively engaging in conflict. As Speer recounts;

> *'To his round table he explained: "Of course we are in a state of war with England and France, but if we on our side avoid all acts of war, the whole business will evaporate. As soon as we sink a ship and they have sizable casualties, the war party over there will gain strength." Even when German U-boats lay in a favorable position near the French battleship Dunkerque he refused to authorize an attack. But the British air raid on Wilhelmshaven and the sinking of the Athenia soon called for a re- consideration of this policy.*

> *He stuck unswervingly to his opinion that the West was too feeble, too worn out, and too decadent to begin the war seriously. Probably it was also embarrassing for him to admit to his entourage and above all to himself that he had made so crucial a mistake.*

> -    *Albert Speer*

This alludes to some chasm between what Hitler envisioned in his imaginative head and cold objective reality. Yet it also alludes to the fact that he was being strong-armed by the allies who blatantly ignored his plainly outlined arguments justifying why he perceived obtaining additional living space as being vital. Hitler saw acquiring living space or *Lebensraum* as essential not just because of current economic, geographical, and social issues, but also because history had demonstrated that it would be foolhardy and lethal to rely on the very nations who were now refusing to help him with the 'Jewish problem' and were instead actively stopping him from acquiring *Lebensraum* to address it in his own way. Germans did not have adequate farm-land to support themselves in times of crisis, and Britain had in the past proven all too willing to withhold food from them in times of crisis – a thing they'd again do in World War II even though it may have contributed to the Nazi's choice to exterminate Jews (it would save food). The allies then played the part of aggressor, and what's worse they knew full well from Hitler fanatically expounding his ideologies throughout the 1930's that when push came to shove he would most definitely distinguish between his own race and Jews.

To an incredibly proud person such as Hitler this might be considered nothing less than instigation. Worse than pride though, Hitler was a principled person; he had not just rallied the better part of a nation behind his ideas, but he himself had truly believed them, and it is this absolute deference to the principle (a quality to which the allies played stupid) that makes their actions tantamount to negligent instigation. With typical western conviction that ideology can be casually dismissed when one has the power of

force on their side, the allies took it upon themselves to put Hitler into a tough spot, and they did so with utter disregard for what might come of it – Jewish lives included.

It then becomes a critical question whether in the emerging modern world nations should actively stop others from conquering other nations to acquire territory, even though it may come at an atrocious loss of human life. Should the fact that we are now in possession of advanced methods suddenly mean we should all just stop the timeless tradition of redefining our borders when a need to do so is there? Or should we all just stop and decide to play fair while pretending there is not a hugely lopsided distribution of land among nations such as America and Russia who also stole it from someone in the past?

Regardless of ideology governing the acquisition of land, the fact is that ideology cannot be 'cured' with the use of force. This is in fact a lesson the west has been presented with several times since Hitler yet refuses to learn.

Hitler was an imaginative creature for whom principles shaped reality not vice versa. On several occasions, he would profess that the war was really a contest of two ideas, and that should he win he'd be a hero, yet if he lost he'd forever be remembered a villain. It was also in line with his WELTANSCHAUUNG that it would be the stronger of the two races who prevails. Should the allies prevail it would be better for Germany itself to be wiped off the face of the planet, and indeed in many ways this is exactly what he seemed to be aiming for in the latter half of the war. Beyond some critical turning point which perhaps occurred in 1942 or which may even have occurred long before the war ever began, it was as though Hitler began to perceive the act of war as one of making a statement – like the imprint it left on people's minds was more important than the end outcome. Repeatedly he demonstrated a clear grasp of objective facts and strategies presented to him only to casually dismiss them in favor of what he thought would have a more profound psychological effect. Meanwhile he closed himself off from the public and kept his generals divided from one another and in some perpetual state of jealously scheming against one another when they were not preoccupied with flattering Hitler by reaffirming whatever machination he had contrived. Yet it was more than flattery to tell the Führer what he wanted to hear – many were genuinely caught up in the rapture of his appeal and willingly they fell into his spell.

However atrocious the outcome, it can hardly be contested that Hitler was a man of vision. It is perfectly confusing however (to me at least) what exactly that vision was. The closer one tries to study the issue the more one appreciates how cloaked in propaganda it all is. The crowd on their part wants little more than to find one target which summarizes all that is wrong with their lives, and this explains the historical mass extermination of the Jews and our present impulses to label Hitler as some demon alike. To this end, it might be said that the Jews simply happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. As for Hitler, he was playing to the crowd every bit as much as he was leading it.

Strangely, the true depths of Hitler's obsession with architecture and how it played into his overall goal is revealed through Speer's account but is hardly alluded to in Hitler's memoir.  Nowhere was the discrepancy between imagination and reality more evident than in Hitler's architectural plans. Even when it came at the cost of vital war production he insisted some of his plans continue to be implemented. With tears in his eyes he shared his grandiose plans of architecture with Speer and how it is through such magnanimous buildings that national pride is born, cultural traditions are preserved, and even small-minded leaders would be able to seem great for generations to come when they speak to an

audience in the enormous 'Globe' which was to be the center of power for the Reich. Indeed, Speer reveals that when Hitler feared his health was failing he confessed that seeing some of his architectural plans through before his death was his overriding goal. Speer notes that such 'megalomania' often precedes the downfall of a tyrant, and that Napoleon too had an obsession for grand architectural scheming, some of the results of which are still evident today in the city of Paris.

## Lebensraum and Charity

What is social and what is economic should be considered one and the same, but it is in the domesticated form of organization social needs and space for community itself come to be treated as commodities. Take for example Starbucks C.E.O. Howard Shultz who has now become a billionaire and positioned himself to even put in a presidential bid. He did not do so by selling America coffee, but by selling them shared spaces. While he would say he brought community to America, another perspective might be to say that he capitalized on decreasing amounts of communal spaces as well as deteriorating levels of social capital among people[12].

And why is space itself never granted as charity? As it has been argued through the tradition of *pomoch* among Russian peasants, land-use and charity are inextricably tied to one another; when land-use rights are lop-sided charity arises. So much inertia has the [domesticated] concept of treating land and human contact itself as commodities gained that it can now be rightfully said that poor people do not have cultural institutions of their own which do not rely on substance abuse, unless of course 7-11, McDonalds, and Starbucks count (all of which still sort of rely on substance abuse).

There is no shortage of philanthropists who fall in love with the sound of their good intentions who do not readily grasp the true nature of the problem – it is a matter of social benefits not resources. To one who looks for it, it is not difficult to occasionally find local developers with an interest in a given area teaming up to 'work with' city leaders and who undergo a sudden transformation from being a NIMBY against homeless to a charitable philanthropist towards them as [somewhere under the table] there is always some benefit to be had by giving charity[13].

> There was hardly any other German city in which the social problem could be studied better than in Vienna. But here I must utter a warning against the illusion that this problem can be 'studied' from above downwards. The man who has never been in the clutches of that crushing viper can never know what its poison is. An attempt to study it in any other way will result only in superficial talk and sentimental delusions. Both are harmful. The first because it can never go to the root of the question, the second because it evades the question entirely. I do not know which is the more nefarious: to ignore social distress, as do the majority of those who have been favoured by fortune and those who have risen in the social scale through their own

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[12] I was in fact tempted to use Howard Shultz's [fictional] rise to presidency instead of San Francisco's conservator program for the fictional piece *Rise of the Fantastic Thousands*. It has the added benefit of Shultz being a Jew, but the goal of this paper is not to promote anti-Semitism. If nothing else the conservator program fit better.

[13] For example, a developer with concerns about a park that attracts homeless near his new property will suddenly start giving to the cause of shelters for women and children. Soon thereafter the park will shut down for some haphazardly contrived reason.

*routine labour, or the equally supercilious and often tactless but always genteel condescension displayed by people who make a fad of being charitable and who plume themselves on 'sympathising with the people.' Of course such persons sin more than they can imagine from lack of instinctive understanding. And thus they are astonished to find that the 'social conscience' on which they pride themselves never produces any results, but often causes their good intentions to be resented; and then they talk of the ingratitude of the people.*

*Such persons are slow to learn that here **there is no place for merely social activities** and that there can be no expectation of gratitude; for in this connection there is no question at all of distributing favours but essentially a matter of retributive justice. I was protected against the temptation to study the social question in the way just mentioned for the simple reason that I was forced to live in the midst of poverty-stricken people. Therefore it was not a question of studying the problem objectively, but rather one of testing its effects on myself. Though the rabbit came through the ordeal of the experiment, this must not be taken as evidence of its harmlessness.*

*- Adolf Hitler*

Equally strange is that charity toward homeless usually seems to aim at dividing the males from the women and children – as though the concept of family should not be allowed to exist among homeless. It is in fact a major part of our strategy to target homeless families, but in all my years I can say I've come across very few homeless *families* as it [homelessness] overwhelmingly seems to be a thing which arises when people lose their family. One might say we place a high moral value on the concept of family, but these things might also be a matter of depriving another demographic of the political leverage which comes from being able to claim family status.

As a man you are deprived of much social contact and political leverage which does come with children unless you yourself produce your own or commit to be the monogamous spouse of someone who does. Whatever happened to the idea of a community raising a child? While children whose instincts guide them more than the established social norms readily avail themselves to strangers it is us [adults] who perceive it as our duty to socialize them in ways that deter this behavior rather than seeing it as an indication that somewhere along the line we messed things up.

Without family or private property, a man has neither significant value nor place within the cities we're constructing. Notice both these things are relatively new inventions in terms of evolution, and if these two singular things constitute the basis from which culture must grow yet they fail to meet the social needs of so many, then what value remains to life for these people? And if the answer is little, then how much more value should we expect such individuals to place on the lives of others? Surely no one will understand when such people become radicals, but neither can it be said they care – least not until it interferes with their world of 'mine-ness'.

People do not organize according to intellect but according to libido; if a means to obtain kinship is available, people will do so, but if they know of no means to obtain such a thing they will direct their life energies at reproduction, monogamous marriage, and the establishment of a family. For those with an interest in doing so it is then a matter of manipulating the environment such that one form of living can take root while the other is stifled. While it can be said that most people today accept the

environment they inherit passively, there is no shortage of people who have taken an active interest in shaping the environment infesting public office or doing so from a private development role.

It is in familial forms of organization that mobility is restricted as one's decisions are strongly influenced by obligations to a closely attached few. It is also the case that in familial forms of organization social needs the family alone cannot fulfill are instead fulfilled only in the most indirect and saddest of ways; consumerism, entertainment, and substance abuse become means of obtaining the need of kinship whose presence is still felt but which struggles to manifest.

If social diseases govern consumption then so too will they come to govern production, and this in turn will shape work opportunities.

Could such foundational concepts such as property and family themselves be considered social diseases? One must acknowledge there are evolutionary disadvantages to placing a higher value on one individual simply because they share your blood over others who may offer superior social and survival benefits. Certainly, a society centered around the ideal of private property with no alternatives that are respected as equal is a grossly inefficient thing with detrimental consequences that will only catch up with us more and more as the future progresses. Nevertheless, family and home seem to define the very basis of the morals weaponized by those with an interest in shaping of the environment. The simple fact is not everyone can afford property that is enough to support a family, and this is likely a contributor to why birth rates are slowing down.

Hitler very much championed family as an organizational unit, but he did acknowledge that to lack balance between production and consumption is symptomatic of social diseases, and he had a strategy to address this by maintaining a healthy balance between a healthy agricultural peasant populace and an industrialized urban one.

***   **Insert: Mein Kampf; The Final Chapter**   ***

**Work: A Sign of the Times?**

Many of the organizational flaws our society has embraced are beginning to manifest in the concept of work. If what is intrinsically motivating to the individual is taken as a metric for determining how nature evolved us, then work should be defined according to what feels natural, else we are trying to outsmart the social systems so carefully honed by nature, but which we hardly understand in terms of academic concepts. Intrinsic motivation at work which is vital to a person's daily well-being has today come to be treated as a convenient second to paying bills.

It was to such daily social deprivation that Hitler appealed to gain power. All of the seemingly inconsequential acts of subterfuge on intangible things like culture and the perfectly natural ability to earn a living by doing meaningful work that is suitable to the individual add up and feed into numerous conflicts throughout history; people fight, and people die over the intangibles, so by what metric are they not to be considered human needs?

The idea that people are equally predisposed to work opportunities presented to them is a sentiment born out of mindless consumerism and shameless capitalism; innate qualities do exist. The culture we establish and the job opportunities that follow will select among a populace in which individuals are predisposed to a unique set of tasks. Though adaptation is certainly a factor, it is disputable whether a person can change their very personality in a single lifetime let alone within a few decisive years of their career. If nothing else, it can be said people possess an instinctive understanding for the social benefits in the transaction that is work. Though I do not mind working for minimum wage, I find it hard to feel intrinsically motivated to help a developer built a quick and cheap building that is going to change the culture and raise the rents of the very area I call home – I am in a sense working to help someone else take my home, and it is no coincidence that on jobs such as this a feeling of extrinsic motivation arises. It is an instinctive calculation of the social contract that occurs first and foremost below a cognitive level.

Hitler's conception of work – that everyone contributes in his or her own way that is suitable to their innate characteristics, and no form of contribution is lesser than the other, but only how one performs their work should factor into merit – begins to have appeal.

Yet just like the Marxist he so opposed, many of Hitler's core ideas are flawed in that they simply don't go back far enough in evolution. If it can be said that many of the issues brought on by industrialization that Adolf Hitler and Karl Marx endeavored to address are not new problems, but rather that technology and industrialization simply catalyzed pre-existing ones, then perhaps they'd both have considered the development of private property itself to be a social disease that has led to many of today's problems. When humans are kept separate they will act separate, and any form of socialism – nationalistic (Nazism) or otherwise – is a slap in the face to mother nature if it in any way expects this to change. Addressing the issue of private property, even minutely, can help restore the balance between production and consumption, equilibrate the job market in a natural way, and help restore kinship and culture alike in the process.

It is interesting to note that were one to replace 'race' with 'private property' many of Hitler's racist ideas would translate[14]. Take for example a passage from my fictional piece *Mein Kampf: the Final Chapter* in which below I've exchanged the term 'race' with 'private property' and made the corresponding minor grammatical changes,

> *This is the very the absurdity of Marxist logic I've faced for so long. It is a tremendous slap in the face to mother nature to say that men, when held separate from one another in a system of private property in which they are ever guided by the concept of what they can label as their own, will do anything other than act separate. When men who have been possessed by a concept such as private property are crammed into cities there will not come revolution followed by peaceful utopic forms of socialism as Karl Marx hypothesized, rather mass urbanization that is geographically confined to small territories shows men their incompatibilities and in turn plants the seeds to violent expulsion, and when this fails, extermination. As can be readily deduced from a careful study of the prevailing social and political conditions here in Germany in the last thirty years, when conditions become favorable to this, there will come a catalyst which triggers all the other elements that are already in place.*

The unfortunate truth is that the cooperative aspects of human nature do not seem to allow convenient middle grounds; we will either all adopt one method of living or the other, but for whatever reason two distinctly different forms of habitation do not seem to abide very well together.


## Extirpation: A Trend for The Future?


As I alluded to in *Mein Kampf; the Final Chapter* there does seem to be a more fundamental thread at play than Jews vs. the rest of humanity, familial vs. kinship forms of organization and nomadism vs. domestication being the most fundamental and pervasive. Jews are known to have strong familial traditions, and it was these family ties in fact which accounts for much of their success in banking over the course of a century prior to Hitler (Windolf, 2015). So too are there parallels between the habitation trends of Jews and homeless 'nomads' in the sense that for millennia Jews as a people have been without a land to call their own, and in the process of settling throughout various regions of the globe they've clashed with others attempt to establish social congruence.

Nomadic vs. sedentary cultures are perhaps the two most incompatible cultures in human history. To quote heavyweight champion Tyson Fury a.k.a. 'The Gypsy King', "Gypsy's are the most hated race on earth". Gypsies in fact, were the only other group of people targeted in the Holocaust for mass extermination, and by some accounts they were considered even more despicable than Jews (Cohn, 1972). Even today one who pay's attention might occasionally come across suggestions that homeless be rounded up in something like a camp and put to work or exterminated. While seemingly harmless, when conditions are right statements such as this borne out of the primitive mind may take root if a person capable of acting as a catalyst comes along.

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[14] Hence, I am not a racist but a 'propertiest'

But how are domestication and nomadism to be connected to the concepts of family and kinship? In short, it has been argued that organizing along familial lines is a byproduct of domestication which began with the development of (or addiction to) the idea of private property. Yet this is contingent on how one defines a nomad. Hitler would define a 'true nomad' as one who roams only out of a need to allow their pasture animals to graze, i.e. nomadism to him was like a mobile form of domestication born out of a need to find better pastures, not a distinctly different way of life. Yet he explicitly stopped his reasoning at a relatively recent point in human history beyond which he believed speculation was pointless.

In many ways, I've come to accept there is a definite tug-and-pull relationship between family and kinship, and that it takes a true nomad to experience true kinship. What I speak of is however an inner experience that cannot be verified with use of a book, it is instead a thing which lies dormant in every person – an evolutionary relic of what must have been our past. More than a way of life, it is a distinct state of mind which one enters when they let go of family and property alike, and furthermore if and when the surrounding society allows opportunities for them to establish social networks that do not fit neatly into the domesticated mold, which unfortunately makes for a sometimes insurmountable wild-card to this argument. Once an individual experience this mindset it is as though an innate trigger is pulled and they find it difficult to return to domesticated life; what was considered shameful, 'cool', or cultural, as well as many more tangible things which may be considered desirable by domiciled folk – these all get redefined. Having hit what has been designated the bottom of domestic society, it becomes critical to such a person to leave behind any sense of shame, accordingly they'll often cut ties with all those in their past life.  sense   It then becomes a matter of how to socialize people so as to come in contact with or to avoid this socializing mechanism.

To allow such a thing to occur I believe is only a healthy thing as people operate in grossly inefficient and degenerative ways when they only know how to fulfill their social and economic needs according to what has become the socially accepted way of living [domestication]. As the saying goes, 'too much of anything is not a good thing' and there is a balance to be achieved.

While technology has certainly catalyzed modernization, the acculturation effects that have paralleled technological developments are due much more to institutions such as banks and universities.

Institutions such as universities socialize people every bit as much as they educate them, yet universities, or certain factions within them, have chosen to use this power to extricate students from the world at large in favor of creating some synthetic ideal of the domestic family life. While it may seem at first glance that university life is a break from family, nearly a decade of traversing from one side to the other the line which divides the reality homeless nomads live and the familial based reality which surrounds them has convinced me that universities are much closer to a walk through the family friendly suburbs than they are to anything which would run contrary to them. In the bubble which universities create, the libido is firmly directed towards sexual desires and relations developed are more typically between one individual to another rather than to a group of people whose members are constantly shifting – this is not kinship. As I endeavored to relate as best I could to my own subjective observations in *Rise of the Fantastic Thousands*, true kinship is not marked by loud noises, substance abuse, or 'fun' activities that are typical associational activities which bring people together in universities. University life is therefore more aptly considered to be the courting phase of family life; it is where people go to the begin a new one, or they are places which facilitate what at best are half-measures to escape the trappings of family life.

*What I refer to as kinship* is what anthropologists today call fictive kinship – is not a tangible thing that can be conveniently labeled. Nonetheless it is an innate and powerful motivator which can be felt. It too is a relic of our past that lays dormant inside of us. It is born out of shared experiences not genetic ties or formal relations. To say it is 'fictional' just because it does not conveniently fit into the academician's arbitrary definition of what is tangible and 'real' is to discount the complexities of the brain, of which academic disciplines hardly understand. It is in fact strange to note that 'real' forms of kinship acknowledged by anthropologists such as 'familial kinship'[15] often do not *really* share in one another's struggles.

Universities have helped produce a generation of 'socially conscious' intellectuals who try to understand real-world conflicts that are driven by cultural factors from the perspective of the synthetic American suburbanite bubbles that they've been socialized in, and they aim to address real-world social issues according to what is tangible.

To be fair, there are numerous people and associations with a plethora of motivations inhabiting universities. To the disciplinarian who cares about his or her craft educational institutions are likely to be one of the few means today to elevate themselves to pursue meaningful work while to others these places are a means to gain status and distinguish themselves. For some universities are a way of life in themselves. Wherever there is a publicly funded pool of money there will be those who cozy up next to and weave their socially selective little nest. There are no shortage of people climbing the latter in universities who gladly would trade in their freedoms and leverages as common humans only to have their sphere of influence limited to one atomic level event – if only they can find a way to get paid to think for a living. These people are fighting to avoid the outside world, and to them the student is an asset to uphold their most precious institution, one that should be used for all it is worth before its release.

While it is understandable that there be conflicting interests at play in universities, it is however unfortunately also true that the federal government has played more than a passive role in this, rather they have intentionally created the demand for education so as to produce a surplus of overeducated people while also supplying the loans they indebt themselves with (Douglas, 2007). Some today have in fact taken to questioning why universities do not co-sign on student loans. On the governmental side, it is ironic how often the federal government has intervened to 'save' people from loan sharks, but when it comes to education they have willingly availed themselves to promoting debt as a way of life. What the government has not seen fit to play much of a role in is to actively maintain the concept of meaningful work. This poses somewhat of a contradiction in the sense that people have taken to attending universities not to prepare themselves to join an economy but to avoid it. Universities on their end are creating an economy rather than aiming to prepare people to join one.

Though it would require a more detailed study to identify more exact mechanism through which banks and universities are affecting our ability to shape the concept of meaningful work, it is fair to say they've both played a significant role in affecting this. Furthermore, some factions within these institutions have done so with much more regard for their own interest than for the general population indebting themselves to these institutions or the the well-being of any nation.

As it pertains to cultural identity and nationalism, the crowd is a docile animal when it sees its life as a matter of resources. The world is a big place full of abundance when seen in this light. Were tangible things like resources all one need take account of, then one could easily arrive at the conclusion that

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[15] The term contradicts itself.

science will eventually remedy whatever problem it exacerbates. Pollution will be addressed by the natural evolution of technologies leading us to an eco-friendly reality. Water is as plenty as is our methods of purifying it. And so long as the resources we harness from the earth are a non-issue, then it can be said that there is plenty of land. All that remains standing in the way of progress is this pesky tendency for other humans to kill one another, and to this must be attributed irrational beliefs of lunatics who in some way need more resources or better technology to improve their lives.

Gone is any true empathy for cultural questions as is our understanding of what true culture is. So powerful can concepts of cultural identity and home be to people these things can drive them to a seemingly random mass-shooting, to fly a plane into a building, or to rally a nation to expel and [when forced to choose] exterminate an entire race. The only thing(s) which sets Hitler apart from the other forms of kamikaze's is that he lived in a tumultuous time/ place and he possessed an ability to articulate the intangible things which ailed him. By doing so he turned the docile the mind of the crowd into a raging beast.

When the intangibles are accounted for the picture changes to one where there does not seem to be enough land for all of us. For Germany with her high population and limited area this might have been perceived to be the case in terms of both resources as well as cultural (or 'racial') issues. Clearly however, Hitler framed the issue to be one of much more than resources. For him culture and identity were major themes which became vital parts of his WELTANSCHAUUNG.

I am not a Nazi, yet neither do I believe in subjective labels such as good and evil. Hitler is a prime case in point that a man's thinking will follow his actions, and he was a surprisingly intelligent person who reached some dangerous conclusions. His idea that cultural characteristics are innate to the color of one's skin is something that many, me included, would dispute as human adaptability and creativity are both subtle things that are not to be underestimated. The real issue seems to be that whatever culture does form it can hardly abide for long without being decimated by 'progress'. Yet this does not mean Hitler was entirely wrong. As I now consider it, Hitler was one of the first, if not the only, modern political historical figures to acknowledge the incompatibilities between human cultures (or races) and that these things might result in an extinction of the human species if they remain on their current course. Afterall, the [modern] intermixing of races and culture has not always been a voluntary thing, but one influenced by processes such as increasingly limited land, industrialization, banking, and slavery. And while the parliaments he so hated scramble to tell the crowd whatever they want to hear, he was one who acted to try to stop it in the form he perceived it to take.

Though he lost the war and his ideas of racism are largely rejected, what if it can be said he was not entirely wrong? Nomadism vs. domestication and family vs. kinship methods of organization are conflicts which manifest in several ways within the societies we construct. Yet nowhere is it clearer than in the heart of a big city.

During a recent parade in which homeless were for once allowed to pitch their tents en masse along the street I noted the clear contrast between the blocks they inhabited and the rest of the parade blocks which were mostly full of families who huddled in their tight knit groups. Families did not talk overly much to those who fell outside their clearly defined lines, and they sat or stood quietly with body language that could rightfully be described as closed-off. Among the homeless there was to be found people talking across group lines and even those off to the side seemed to be caught up in some

intangible vibe that I could not adequately convey with the use of written words yet could feel as I walked through them.  Their body language reminded me of a pack of wild cats at home in their native plain. While it was far from the first time I've seen and felt this unexpectedly positive effect take root in homeless crowds, it is unfortunately rare the surrounding society opens itself up for it to occur.

To one involved at the local level in such affairs, it seems to be the very goal of local representatives, private developers, various official authorities, and city planners to do whatever is within their power to stifle this contagion effect from taking root in any consistent fashion. Rather than stable environments which could make for controlled studies of homeless as a group, the norm for homeless crowds is instead to form isolated pockets wherever they are allowed and for however long they are tolerated.

Meanwhile 'researchers' focus most exclusively on how to fit the individual back into the culture which surrounds them. Gone is the question of culture and kinship. Instead, through decades of intentional framing of the issue, homelessness has come to be considered strictly a clinical issue[16] for the individual rather than the group. Researchers are in effect trying their best to justify how and why it is an individual's failure to conform to the surrounding environment rather than the surrounding environments failure to conform to the needs of the individuals. The former is a much easier question to address than the latter, which makes getting a paper published or a policy enacted on the subject much easier. Much more sinister than this though is that among the self-interested associations which form a democratic bureaucracy there are those who infiltrate to position themselves where they can interpret facts to suit their own ends. Intentionally or otherwise, it seems to be job security which fuels them more than resolving anything.

Again, in comes the issue of work. Rather than creating a world of abundance technological, financial, and industrial 'advancements' have induced numerous associational groups who seek to create their own employment by making the well-being and livelihoods of others reliant on themselves. ***It is in effect becoming a parasitic job market***.

Bias is not entirely difficult to spot. All to prevalent in social science research and policy statements are subjective phrases such as 'prosperity' used as a metric for determining progress and for measuring 'cultural capital' (Douglas, 2007), and it is these researchers who coincidently inhabit some of the top universities and benefit the most from the publishing of their own opinion being disguised as research. If enough of these researchers on the topic find consensus this is taken by democratic representatives as a consensus among people themselves; as though they all agreed to have the quality of their life measured with academic figures.

What if it can be said homeless together form a class which exert intangible and even subconscious factors of influence on one another, and only they as an entire group are in possession of the power to pull one another off the streets or otherwise improve their condition? In this case it would be necessary to treat the issue as a group phenomenon in which intangible things like culture, work opportunities that are meaningful to one's demographic, and associationism need to be accounted for. Homeless in fact make for a prime demographic in which associationism that is so critical to society might be studied, yet this demographic has gone almost completely overlooked for such applications.

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[16] An issue in which the results of treatment are inextricably tied to the place of treatment.

These are legitimate questions that research strictly avoids as it is considered taboo by the prevailing culture to do so. Incompatible cultures like nomadism and domestication make for a tug-a-war which grant no convenient middle ground.

In today's progressive culture, though we celebrate things like 'cultural diversity', these things in fact usually amount to little more than opening the door for people of different cultures to join into one big culture-deficient hegemony, unless of course strip-malls, Starbucks, bars, and Netflix are to be equated to genuine culture. Nay, these 'cultural diversity' statements usually serve as an opportunity for some progressive representative to put themselves on a pedestal by showing how much they contrast to what has become taboo – it is taboo to entertain the notion that we are not all the same, it is taboo to openly discuss the idea that our differences might prove to be incompatible, and that pretending otherwise might one day have serious repercussions.

Whether it be a matter of the cooperative overlap between associations disintegrating or of associations transforming from passive to engaged via some other mechanism such as opening their ears to the oratory of radical members of the public, there is certainly some threshold beyond which the crowds of men revert to a 'primitive horde'. Were such a thing to occur in coming centuries a tribal-like mind-set would then suddenly awaken within the masses and in the midst of centuries worth of urbanization that has shoved us into cities like sardines.

Just because our primitive impulses have been shoved to the background does not mean there is not a threshold beyond which they will again take control of us.

To put together a few elements covered in this paper, the idea of property may constitute such a threshold. For the sake of property otherwise autonomous and self-interested groups have given up many of their freedoms and their interests alike in favor of cooperating with a wide number of other self-interested associational groups via democratic mechanisms which rely on the temporary overlapping interests of these groups. But property is one interest that is constant and which accounts for why these groups would begin to trade in their freedoms, but there is nothing democratic about. Only because it has remained a constant overlapping interest that not need be subjected to a vote has it served to uphold the idea of democracy. ***Property provides the most foundational overlap of interests between associational groups; it upholds democracy***.

From the perspective of someone who socialized himself in a different way than a typical academician through over five years of living without property, when one becomes acclimated to such a life it only gets harder to come back to domesticated 'reality' as your sense of cooperativity is replaced with a reversion back to a strong and natural sense of autonomy; you no longer *hope* for meaningful activity to call work, you *demand* it, else you simply go back to using the two hands given you to make for yourself on the land given all of us. There also comes a near insatiable need for mobility; to go to the land you gravitate to. Whereas such things might be considered a second to the domiciled academician, to one socialized to the nomadic life meaningful activity, freedom, and going to the land they gravitate to are organizational principles which will supersede property and obtaining a paycheck if forced to choose between these things.

All that remains then is for the idea of property to reach the point of being unobtainable. After this point the overlap of interests which holds associational groups together will rapidly deteriorate and they

will begin to open their ears to the most radical of their shamans which they've hit the mute button on in favor of indulging in their favorite pre-historic addiction [property].

Though it seems a somewhat stupid thing to fail to address this somewhat obvious flaw in today's planning of tomorrows future, we as people are subjective creatures and worse, we are addicts who will refute objective truths until all possible avenues have been explored and until our addiction has progressed to the point of causing the body to deteriorate such that it can no longer pick up the pipe – only then will we admit we have a problem. In the mean-time parliamentary politicians are more concerned with popularity and they will tell people what they want not what they need.

Hitler may have been wrong to say tangible differences like one's 'race' is what makes us incompatible, yet still one must seriously question whether people coming together en masse and in a restricted territory is a sustainable thing. And so too should the human need for culture be granted the highest degree of consideration.

The U.S. with all of its cultural diversity statements has not disproven the idea of incompatibilities among humans, we have rather bypassed it in favor of shoving people into one-size-fits all culture deficient hegemonies that are fueled by banks, sustained with consumerism, and guided by politicians 'leading people' by weaponizing urban planning – all of which take completely inadequate account of social benefits. Did our 'intelligence' allow us to outsmart our social needs with the use of money? If not, then perhaps we are planting some bad seeds.

Ironically, while cultural contagion might explain the spreading of Aryan civilizations, serfdom and slavery explain modern progressivism which holds little respect for tradition or creative and quality architecture[17]. As is readily deduced from the modern history of numerous races, before banks and universities it was serfdom and slavery which were the most powerful tools for extinguishing traditional lines of culture; when a race is subjected to such conditions for a sufficient amount of time there is bound to come a point in which such a race will have forgotten their traditions and will be nothing less than grateful for the opportunity to join the very culture of the race which subjugated them. By this point they call it progress.

If our dealing with the issue of homelessness is to judge by, we've all but acknowledged to ourselves that two cultures cannot coexist without one subjugating the other.

Adolf Hitler, or at least the Nazi regime, attempted an extirpation – a local extermination – of the Jewish race. However atrocious this may be, it serves little purpose to avoid understanding the roots of what caused it; they in some way thought they were being extirpated first.

Today we weaponize the phrase 'Nazi scum' as though it is in some way fundamentally different than anti-Semitic epithets tossed around by the public in the 1920's. Much of what allows us to abide by subjective labels of what is 'good' and what is 'evil' is by using death of the physical body as a metric for determining who is evil; those who bring death of the body are evil. Yet much of what instigates lethal conflict is social and cultural in nature, hence while the accuser has conveniently measured the 'taking of life' as a strict matter of destroying what is physical the accused has had to endure a life of being in some way deprived of social and cultural benefits – perhaps to the point of feeling their life has already been taken.

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[17] See *Mein Kampf: The Final Chapter.*

**Conclusion: The Remission of Guilt**

The term *Holocaust* implies a Jewish sacrifice in which the offering is burnt in its entirety; complete remission of guilt. Notice how countless peoples are to be found who are more than willing to label the act of a tyrant and those who fell under his spell, but far less common is it for anyone to give serious consideration to the underlying factors which led up to the atrocities in the Holocaust. If we do not understand the intricate details of the times, the place, and the people how are any of us so sure we'd not allow another Holocaust to evolve?

In a similar fashion this same tendency – one might call it an impulse – to find a scapegoat for our problems rather than address them at a causal level manifest in so many facets of politics today. People blame corporations rather than the consumers empowering them. Political 'leaders' rise when a given social and cultural environment allows them to do so, yet how many protest rallies champion the cause of changing our very lifestyle which creates the political/ economic/ cultural environments we experience rather than blaming Donald Trump? People love to blame banks, but how many people refrain from depositing their money in them? At the center of all of this it has been argued lies the concept of private property; humankind has taken the form of a vicious addict who refuses to acknowledge they have a problem, but instead blame what comes of their pervasive addiction on whatever makes itself available.

Considering that in what we as humans perceive to be a morally sound event of creating a single home we are liable to displacing and even annihilating entire colonies of insects, and today we live in what geneticists have deemed a genetic age of extinction, saying that events such as the Holocaust contradict the idea of a benevolent god amounts to nothing more than that we are special because we are human. Even were this the case, consider the ways in which we pull one another into our cooperative webs that are centered around the entirely selfish ideals of family and private property. What if these things do not meet the social needs of a given individual? Such a person must then seek a community of kinship, but kinship is not even allowed to take root in today's cities. There would then ensue innumerable instances in which countless people resort to unhealthy habits (e.g. drugs), degenerative forms of association (e.g. gangs), or they simply live without what nature left them predisposed to which is grounds for mental illness to arise, and all these things in some way or another lead to a premature death. How many people then can be said to have fallen victim to what is perceived to be an incredibly moral undertaking when governmental representatives or private associational groups regularly fight to create a family friendly environment that we all must find a way to endure?

As I speculated in *Mein Kampf; the Final Chapter*, it was perhaps Hitler's goal with his grandiose architectural plans to install in the public a source of pride, culture, creativity, and unity. The effect buildings have on people is a subtle thing, yet it is a very powerful thing that should not be casually dismissed. Today we have no significant standards on materials and designs that take nearly sufficient account for the psychological, social, and cultural effects buildings have.

Were we as a people really all that concerned with addressing the underlying causes of what occurred, one lesson learned from the Holocaust  might be to never put your money into a bank, yet

someone in a costume trying to stop people from making a deposit does not have the same emotional tug or make for the same theatrical drama as does a superhero killing Nazi's.

The crowd likes superhero's and villains. Of course, the crowd would swear it only likes one and not the other, but in truth they are not so different; the hero is the one who sacrifices themselves to vanquish the embodiment of everything the crowd feels a deeply unconscious sense of guilt over [the primal father]. In a sense the hero is a new primal father – he is the father and the protector of the family unit while the father of kinship has already met the inevitable end of any hero who dare take on the sins of the group; he has been unceremoniously labelled a villain when the group changes its mind then butchered and ceremoniously burnt to ashes. Notice that the villain does not usually have friends, and neither does he or she have many close attachments. It is curious how these characteristics are treated as a priori qualities of an evil-doer as they are also characteristics of kinship. Meanwhile the actor playing the hero hoards real life social benefits and offers on-screen definitions of an evil-doer; it is one who destroys the flesh, not one who strips away and hoards social benefits. The lives of the audience then may just as well be defined as a mound of flesh able to breathe and to see the screen before going back to their isolated world of 'mine-ness' only to find the occasional reprieve via practices of consumerism, cheap entertainment, and substance abuse.

It would be wrong however to blame such intermediaries who have simply learned to capitalize off the addiction of the masses by turning shared space, land, and human contact into commodities. The real problem is the addiction, not the dealer. People, in their vicious addiction to private property create the environment that a few learn to use to their benefit. And they must do so as this is an addiction which has created a world of eat or get eaten.

Whether it be families vs. kindred, nomads vs. domesticate folk, or Jews vs. the remainder of humanity I doubt I am alone in saying that mass urbanization does not come without producing a divide among people. So too can it be said that somewhere in the process of urbanization a body of people either comes to disregard such a concept as social benefits or they simply lose their ability to keep track of them in their transactions in any meaningful way. The result is a lopsided trade-off; wealthy classes who lack social capital while others who for some inexplicable reason make no attempt to join society but instead let their identity unravel until they wind up on a corner shouting incoherent curses at the whole of humanity.

The deterioration of kinship would explain much of these things, yet researchers are clearly demonstrating a bias in that they overlook its value, and they cut down Freud's theory of the paternal father because it does not fit neatly into today's family friendly environment.

This same bias also manifests in the study of some forms of mental illness. Delusional Disorder for example is a condition in which otherwise functional persons start to experience delusions. While most disregard the idea of the need to obtain social benefits as playing any role in this, as to entertain the notion that someone experiencing delusions might in some way have an ulterior agenda [they are in effect lying] is considered unprofessional, Edward Hagen sets forth an explanation for delusional disorder which sets aside social correctness and explores a middle ground; delusions are not a lie, rather they are an imaginative way of expressing to the surrounding society that something is deeply wrong with the social contract. Delusions are an evolutionary response to abject social failure of the individual and they serve as a warning call to the surrounding group who is helping to write the social contract that

the individual must fit into. Hagen notes the symptoms of delusional disorder have been known to dissipate in small isolated communities when the community acknowledges the delusion as in some way being real. In today's large urbanized environment however, this warning mechanism does not work out the same; the warning goes unheeded, and the individual's delusions only get worse (Hagen, 2008). I cannot help but feel this has several parallels the idea of a shaman.

**\*\*\*   Insert: Rise of the Fantastic Thousands   \*\*\***

*At the dawn of civilisation a swarm of men of various origin, brought together by the chances of migrations, invasions, and conquests. Of different blood, and of equally different languages and beliefs, the only common bond of union between these men is the half-recognised law of a chief. The psychological characteristics of crowds are present in an eminent degree in these confused agglomerations. They have the transient cohesion of crowds, their heroism, their weaknesses, their impulsiveness, and their violence. Nothing is stable in connection with them. They are barbarians.*

*At length time accomplishes its work. The identity of surroundings, the repeated intermingling of races, the necessities of life in common exert their influence. The assemblage of dissimilar units begins to blend into a whole, to form a race; that is, an aggregate possessing common characteristics and sentiments to which heredity will give greater and greater fixity. The crowd has become a people, and this people is able to emerge from its barbarous state. However, it will only entirely emerge therefrom when, after long efforts, struggles necessarily repeated, and innumerable recommencements, it shall have acquired an ideal. The nature of this ideal is of slight importance; whether it be the cult of Rome, the might of Athens, or the triumph of Allah, it will suffice to endow all the individuals of the race that is forming with perfect unity of sentiment and thought.*

*At this stage a new civilisation, with its institutions, its beliefs, and its arts, may be born. In pursuit of its ideal, the race will acquire in succession the qualities necessary to give it splendour, vigour, and grandeur. At times no doubt it will still be a crowd, but henceforth, beneath the mobile and changing characteristics of crowds, is found a solid substratum, the genius of the race which confines within narrow limits the transformations of a nation and overrules the play of chance.*

*After having exerted its creative action, time begins that work of destruction from which neither gods nor men escape. Having reached a certain level of strength and complexity a civilisation ceases to grow, and having ceased to grow it is condemned to a speedy decline. The hour of its old age has struck.*

*This inevitable hour is always marked by the weakening of the ideal that was the mainstay of the race. In proportion as this ideal pales all the religious, political, and social structures inspired by it begin to be shaken.*

*With the progressive perishing of its ideal the race loses more and more the qualities that lent it its cohesion, its unity, and its strength. The personality and intelligence of the individual may increase, but at the same time this collective egoism of the race is replaced by an excessive development of the egoism of the individual, accompanied by a weakening of character and a lessening of the capacity for action. What constituted a people, a unity, a whole, becomes in the end an agglomeration of individualities lacking cohesion, and artificially held together for a time by its traditions and institutions. It is at this stage that men, divided by their interests and aspirations, and incapable any longer of self-government, require directing in their pettiest acts, and that the State exerts an absorbing influence.*

*With the definite loss of its old ideal the genius of the race entirely disappears; it is a mere swarm of isolated individuals and returns to its original state — that of a crowd. Without consistency and without a future, it has all the transitory characteristics of crowds. Its civilisation is now without stability, and at the mercy of every chance. The populace is sovereign, and the tide of barbarism mounts. The civilisation may still seem brilliant because it possesses an outward front, the work of a long past, but it is in reality an edifice crumbling to ruin, which nothing supports, and destined to fall in at the first storm.*

*To pass in pursuit of an ideal from the barbarous to the civilised state, and then, when this ideal has lost its virtue, to decline and die, such is the cycle of the life of a people.*

- *Gustave Le Bon*

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